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TORT REFORM IN MISSISSIPPI:




A. The Mississippi Products Liability Act of 1993 - Its Purpose
In 1993, as a result of tort reform efforts,1 the Mississippi legislature enacted
legislation that made dramatic changes in the law of products liability as well as
in the law of punitive damages.2 On July 1, 1994, the substantive portions of the
new legislation became effective,3 and the products liability portion of the new
legislation4 replaced the judicially adopted Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts' as the primary basis of products liability law in the state.'
Those who supported the new Act did so because they saw it as a way to bring
stability and predictability to the law of products liability in Mississippi.'
Governor Fordice supported the measure as making "our product liability laws
clearer and fairer for all our people."' Stability and fairness to both producers
and consumers are laudable goals, but as this Article will demonstrate, the Act
may actually result in more confusion and less fairness for the people and busi-
nesses of Mississippi. The Act is deeply flawed, and the legislature needs to
more carefully address products liability reform.
* PART 1I of this Article will appear in Volume 17 No. 2 of the Mississippi COLLEGE LAW REvtEw, forth-
coming in the Spring of 1997.
** Associate Professor, Mississippi College School of Law, B.S. 1977, Louisiana State University; LL.M.
1981, New York University. The author wishes to thank Professors Jeffrey Jackson and Carol West for their
helpful comments on earlier draft versions of this Article. The work on this Article was supported in part by a
summer research grant from the Mississippi College School of Law.
1. Jay Eubank, Tort Reform Bill Headed to Fordice, CLARION-LEDGER, Feb. 18, 1993, at Al.
2. Act of Feb. 18, 1993, H.B. 1270, 1993 Miss. Laws ch. 302, (codified MISS. CODE ANN. § 1-1-63 (Supp.
1995)) (concerning product liability claims); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65 (Supp. 1995) (concerning punitive
damage claims); amended Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-13 (Supp. 1995) (concerning wrongful death claims); and
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-715 (Supp. 1995) (concerning damages for breach of warranty). For a discussion of
the effect of the 1993 legislation on claims for wrongful death, see Bobby Harges, An Evaluation of the
Mississippi Products LiabilityAct of1993, 63 Miss. L.J. 697, 753-65 (1994).
3. Section 5 of the Act provides:
This act shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 1993. Procedural provisions of this
act including subsections (1)(a), (b), (c) and (d) of Section 2 (pertaining to punitive damages) shall
apply to all pending actions in which judgment has not been entered on the effective date of the act
and all actions filed on or after the effective date of the act. All other provisions shall apply to all
actions filed on or after July 1, 1994.
Act of Feb. 18, 1993, H.B. 1270, 1993 Miss. Laws, ch. 302, sec. 5.
4. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (Supp. 1995) [hereinafter referred to as the Mississippi Products Liability
Act of 1993 or the Act].
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter Section 402A].
6. See State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1966); Sperry-
New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248 (Miss. 1993).
7. Product-liability Provision Gets Boost From House, CLARION-LEDGER, Mar. 18, 1992, at B2.
8. Jay Eubank, Tort Reform Bill Headed to Fordice, CLARION-LEDGER, Feb. 18, 1993, at Al.
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B. The Scope of theAct
A determination of the scope of the Act is basic to understanding its proper
application. Initially, the question is whether the legislature intended to occupy
the field of products liability and to generally replace the common law of prod-
ucts liability, with the explicit exception of common law defenses,' or whether
the legislature merely intended to provide minimum requirements for claimants
to meet, leaving it to the common law to provide an affirmative cause of action.
The language of the Act creates the possibility of an issue on this point because
the legislature wrote the Act in the negative, stating when a manufacturer or sell-
er will not be liable, rather than affirmatively stating when a manufacturer or
seller will be liable.1  Because of the absence of language affirmatively creating
a cause of action, an argument exists that the Act merely limits or modifies exist-
ing common law rights without replacing them. However, the overall structure of
the Act creates the impression that the legislature intended to create exclusive
causes of action for injuries caused by products" and to replace common law,
except as to defenses,12 and where resort to common law is necessary to supply
definitions of terms not otherwise defined in the Act." The Act's language
appears to occupy the field, relying on the common law to provide definitions
and defenses in addition to those enumerated in the Act.
C. An Overview of the Act
The Act requires that the claimant prove the existence of a defect at the time
the product left the control of the manufacturer or seller, that the product was
defective and unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer and that the defec-
9. The Act provides that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to eliminate any common law defense
to an action for damages caused by a product." Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(h) (Supp. 1995).
10. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a) (Supp. 1995). The Act provides in pertinent part:
In any action for damages caused by a product except for commercial damage to the product itself:
(a) The manufacturer or seller of the product shall not be liable if the claimant does not prove by the
preponderance of the evidence that at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer or
seller... [the product was defective] and
(ii) The defective condition rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to the use or consumer;
and
(iii) The defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the product proximately cause the dam-
ages for which the recovery is sought.
Id.
11. The descriptive title of H.B. 1270 described the act as "[a]n Act to Codify Certain Rules and Establish
New Rules Applicable to Product Liability Actions." See infra text accompanying notes 18-32, for a discussion
of the establishment of categories of defect under which claims must be brought.
12. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(h) (Supp. 1995) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to eliminate
any common law defense to an action for damages caused by a product.").
13. The Act does not define its key terms. As this Article demonstrates, the lack of definitions creates
unnecessary confusion in the law despite the stated purpose of its promoters to clarify and stabilize the law of
products liability in Mississippi.
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tive condition proximately caused damage.14 The requirement of proof that a
defect existed when the product left the defendant's control does not represent a
change in the law.1" The proximate cause requirement also is not new.1
However, the term "unreasonably dangerous" as used in the Act appears to make
a change in the law. Under the Act, the law apparently no longer provides for a
claim resulting from defects that render a product unreasonably dangerous to
bystanders or property as opposed to consumers or users. 7
1. Categories of Defect
In setting forth the basis of liability for sellers and manufacturers, the Products
Liability Act creates four exclusive categories of defect: (1) design defect; (2)
warnings or instruction defect; (3) deviation defect (a defect that results from a
deviation from product specifications, either during the manufacturing process or
at some later point prior to delivery to a consumer or purchaser); 8 and (4) breach
of express warranty. 9 In creating these exclusive categories of product defects,
the Act apparently eliminates implied warranty as a theory for recovery for dam-
ages caused by a defective product, except as to the product itself.
20
a. Design Defects
The Act moves the theory of liability for design defects from strict liability
under Section 402A to one that is more akin to negligence.21 The claimant must
show that "the manufacturer or seller knew, or in light of reasonably available
knowledge or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known about the
14. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a) (Supp. 1995) (emphasis added). The Act provides in pertinent part:
In any action for damages caused by a product except for commercial damage to the product itself:
(a) The manufacturer or seller of the product shall not be liable if the claimant does not prove by the
preponderance of the evidence that at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer or
seller ... [the product was defective] and
(ii) The defective condition rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer;
and
(iii) The defective and unreasonably dangerous condition of the product proximately cause the dam-
ages for which the recovery is sought.
Id.
15. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 291 So. 2d 169, 171 (Miss. 1974).
16. Id. at 173.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 286-328 and 362-72.
18. This type of defect has been traditionally referred to as a "manufacturing defect," however, this Article
uses the term "deviation defect" since the scope of the defect is not limited to defects occurring during the
manufacturing process. For example, deviation defects may occur during shipping from the manufacturer to
the distributor, or even when the product is placed on the retailer's shelf.
19. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1 -1-63(a)(1) (Supp. 1995). In creating the categories of defect, the Act provides:
(a) The manufacturer or seller of the product shall not be liable if the claimant does not prove by the
preponderance of the evidence that at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer or
seller:
(i) 1. The product was defective because it deviated in a material way from the manufacturer's spec-
ifications or from otherwise identical units manufactured to the same manufacturing specifications,
or
2. The product was defective because it failed to contain adequate warnings or instructions, or
3. The product was designed in a defective manner, or
4. The product breached an express warranty or failed to conform to other express factual represen-
tations upon which the claimant justifiably relied in electing to use the product ....
Id.
20. But see Harges, supra note 2, at 729, 732.
21. But see Harges, supra note 2, at 712 (contending that the act is "similar to existing Mississippi products
liability law based on strict liability in tort").
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danger that caused the damage."22 Under the prior law, a plaintiff making a
design defect claim only needed to prove that the product was unreasonably dan-
gerous in design; the seller's lack of knowledge of the danger was immaterial
because the focus was on the product itself, not the manufacturer's fault.23
Moreover, under the new Act, the claimant must prove the feasibility of an alter-
native design.24
b. Warnings and Instruction Defects
The Act likewise articulates a negligence-based approach to liability for defec-
tive warnings or instructions. This approach does not make an appreciable
change in the law since courts have treated warnings defects under Section 402A
in a manner virtually indistinguishable from a negligence standard."5 Under the
Act, the claimant must prove that the manufacturer or seller knew or should have
known about the danger that caused the damage and that the ordinary user or
consumer would not be aware of the danger.26 The Act deems adequate a warn-
ing or instruction that a reasonable person would provide under the circum-
stances.
c. Deviation Defects and Breaches of Express Warranty
The Act retains strict liability as a basis of liability for the manufacturer or sell-
er for defects which result from flaws that occur during the manufacturing
22. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(f)(i) (Supp. 1995). Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT
I JiurLITY A 2(b) (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1995) [rin- TV .. ,'~putcti eetv nosg'  9' b , . .. ..I e n a f c .. . ... -. D R A T ' (" ' p ro d u c t is d e fe c tiv e in d e s ig n
when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of
a reasonable alternative design by the seller. and the omission of the alternative design renders the product
not reasonably safe .... ").
23. See Hall v. Mississippi Chem. Express, Inc., 528 So. 2d 796, 799 (Miss. 1988); State Stove Mfg. Co. v.
Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 120-21 (Miss.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1966).
24. MISS. CODE ANN. § I l-l-63(f)(ii) (Supp. 1995). The Act provides with reference to feasible alternative
design that the claimant must prove that
the product failed to function as expected and that there existed a feasible design alternative that
would have to a reasonable probability prevented the harm. A feasible alternative design is a design
that would have to a reasonable probability prevented the harm without impairing the utility, useful-
ness, practicality or desirability of the product to users or consumers.
Id.
25. See I M. STUART MADDEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, § 10.3 (2d ed. 1988); cf Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. v.
Fortenberry, 530 So. 2d 688, 691-92 (Miss. 1988) (holding that a drug manufacturer must warn of the drug's
known adverse effects and that "[a]n adequate warning is one reasonable under the circumstances").
26. MISS. CODE ANN. § 1 -1-63(c)(1) (Supp. 1995). The Act provides with respect to knowledge of the dan-
ger that:
In any action alleging that a product is defective because it failed to contain adequate warnings or
instructions pursuant to paragraph (a)(i)2 of this section, the manufacturer or seller shall not be
liable if the claimant does not prove by the preponderance of the evidence that at the time the prod-
uct left the control of the manufacturer or seller, the manufacturer or seller knew or in light of rea-
sonably available knowledge should have known about the danger that caused the damage for which
recovery is sought and that the ordinary user or consumer would not realize its dangerous condition.
Id.
27. MISS. CODE ANN. § 1 l-1-63(c)(i) (Supp. 1995). The Act defines an adequate warning or construction as
one that a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances would have provided with
respect to the danger and that communicates sufficient information on the dangers and safe use of
the product, taking into account the characteristics of, and the ordinary knowledge common to an
ordinary consumer who purchases the product; or in the case of a prescription drug, medical device
or other product that is intended to be used only under the supervision of a physician or other
licensed professional person, taking into account the characteristics of, and the ordinary knowledge
common to, a physician or other licensed professional who prescribes the drug, device or other
product.
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process or otherwise occur while the product is in the chain of distribution before
delivery to the user or consumer.28 The manufacturer or seller is liable for any
material deviation in the product that exists at the time the product left the con-
trol of the manufacturer or seller. Since the liability for a deviation defect is
strict under the Act, there is no change in the law as to this type of defect.29
The Act also makes the manufacturer or seller strictly liable for the breach of
an express warranty or for the product's failure to conform to express factual rep-
resentations made to the consumer or user when he has justifiably relied upon
the warranty or representation.3" The inclusion of express breach of warranty
within products liability law, rather than the application of the traditional rules of
the Uniform Commercial Code, represents a departure from prior law.31 The
requirement that the claimant prove justifiable reliance may also represent a
departure from prior law.32
2. Interests Protected
If literally interpreted by the courts, the Act may have far reaching effects on
the interests protected that the legislature may not have fully intended or antici-
pated.3" The Act provides that its terms govern any claim for damage against a
manufacturer or seller caused by a product, except claims for commercial dam-
age to the product itself.3 4 Thus, in addition to the right to recover damages for
physical harm to person or property, the Act appears to cover pure economic loss
claims. Traditionally, warranty law and contract law, rather than tort law, cover
pure economic loss claims.3" Where a claim involves either personal injury or
damage to other property, plaintiffs may also claim out of pocket losses and con-
sequential damages.3 By its language, the Act appears to eliminate claims for
property damages or pure economic loss when the product is not unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer as opposed to bystanders or property. The
elimination of such claims represents a dramatic departure from the law of prod-
ucts liability and the law of warranty.3
28. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(i)l (Supp. 1995). The Act states that a product is defective if"it deviated
in a material way from the manufacturer's specifications or from otherwise identical units manufactured to the
same manufacturing specifications." Id.
29. Section 402A does not categorize defects by type. Section 402A, supra note 5. However, courts and
commentators have done so in applying Section 402A. Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products
Liabilitv: The ALI Restatement Project, 48 VAND. L. REV. 631, 659 (1995). The traditional categories have been
design defects, manufacturing defects and warnings defects. Id. Under Section 402A courts have applied strict
liability to design and manufacturing defects, but have treated warnings cases more like traditional negligence
cases. 1 MADDEN, supra note 25, § 10.3.
30. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(i)4 (Supp. 1995). The Act provided that the manufacturer or seller is
liable for injuries caused by a product when "[tihe product breached an express warranty or failed to conform
to other express factual representations upon which the claimant justifiably relied in electing to use the prod-
uct." Id.
31. See generally Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-313, 75-2-318, 75-2-714 (1972), 75-2-715 (Supp. 1995). But
see Harges, supra note 2, at 729.
32. See JEFFREY D. WITTENBERG, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: THE LAW IN Mississippi § 3-3 (1982); Harges, supra
note 2, at 725.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 294-328.
34. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (Supp. 1995). The Act provides the basis for "any action for damages
caused by a product, except for commercial damages to the product itself." Id.
35. W PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 95, 101 (5th ed. 1984) [here-
inafter PROSSER & KEETON].
36. 2 MADDEN, supra note 25, § 22.1, at 308.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 303-323. But see Harges, supra note 2, at 729, 732.
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3. Punitive Damages
In addition, the 1993 tort reform legislation made changes to the law regarding
punitive damages, including specific rules pertaining to product liability
claims."5 In particular, the new punitive damage statute restricts claims for puni-
tive damages against nonmanufacturer sellers to cases involving the active cre-
ation by the seller of the dangerous condition that caused the claimant's injury
where the seller acted maliciously, fraudulently, or with willful, wanton or reck-
less disregard for the safety of others.3 9
4. Defenses
Under the traditional common law of Mississippi, assumption of the risk was a
complete bar to a strict products liability claim,4" although courts have rarely
applied it. 1 The Act codifies the doctrine as a complete bar to a products liabili-
ty claim. 42 The Act also makes "open and obvious danger" a complete defense to
claims arising from failure to warn.4" In addition, it appears to make "open and
obvious danger" a complete defense to design defect claims as well. 4, The
reestablishment of the "patent danger" rule represents a departure from recent
pronouncements by the Mississippi Supreme Court.4' The Act also provides that
it does not eliminate any common law defense applicable to a products liability
claim.4"
38. See MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65 (Supp. 1995). For a discussion of the changes made by the 1993 legis-
lation to the law of punitive damages see Harges, supra note 2, at 737-44.
39. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11- 1-65 (Supp. 1995). See infra text accompanying notes 331-34.
40. See Nichols v. Western Auto Supply Co., 477 So. 2d 261, 264 (Miss. 1985). However, in the recent case
of Horton v. American Tobacco Co., 667 So. 2d 1289 (Miss. 1995), a majority of the court indicated that the
doctrine of assumption of the risk should be encompassed by Mississippi's comparative fault doctrine. See id.
at 1293 (plurality opinion by Banks, J.), 1305 (Dan Lee, J., concurring in part, joined by Sullivan, Pittman, and
McRae, JJ.).
41. Richardson v. Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co., 63 F Supp. 1480 (N.D. Miss. 1987); Yarbrough v. Phipps,
285 So. 2d 788, 790 (Miss. 1973).
42. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(d) (Supp. 1995). The Act provides:
In any action alleging that a product is defective pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section, the manu-
facturer or seller shall not be liable if the claimant (i) had knowledge of a condition of the product
that was inconsistent with his safety; (ii) appreciated the danger in the condition; and (iii) deliberate-
ly and voluntarily chose to expose himself to the danger in such a manner to register assent on the
continuance of the dangerous condition.
Id.
43. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(e) (Supp. 1995). The Act provides:
In any action alleging that a product is defective pursuant to paragraph (a)(i)2 of this section, the
manufacturer or seller shall not be liable if the danger posed by the product is known or is open and
obvious to the user or consumer of the product, or should have been known or open and obvious to
the user or consumer of the product, taking into account the characteristics of, and the ordinary
knowledge common to, the persons who ordinarily use or consume the product.
Id.
44. MISS. CODE ANN. § 1 1-1-63(f)(ii) (Supp. 1995). In order to prove a design defect, among other things,
the plaintiff must prove that the product failed to perform as expected. Id. Thus, where a defect is open and
obvious, the consumer would expect the product to function in a manner consistent with the defect.
45. See Materials Transp. Co. v. Newman, 656 So. 2d 1199, 1202 (Miss. 1995); Tharp v. Bunge Corp., 641
So. 2d 20, 25 (Miss. 1994); and Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 256 n.4 (Miss. 1993).
46. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(h) (Supp. 1995). The Act provides: "Nothing in this section shall be con-
strued to eliminate any common law defense to an action for damages caused by a product." Id. While the
Mississippi Supreme Court has never explicitly ruled that contributory negligence may be used as a defense to
reduce the plaintiff's recovery in a strict products liability claim, most likely the court would find that compara-
tive fault rules are applicable in such a case. See Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 E2d 276, 290 (5th Cir.
1975). See also Harges, supra note 2, at 746-47. Misuse is also a common law defense in a products liability
case. Materials Transp. Co. v. Newman, 656 So. 2d 1199, 1202 (Miss. 1995).
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5. Indemnity
The Act sets forth the right of a nonmanufacturer-seller to claim indemnity
from the manufacturer for litigation costs, reasonable expenses including attor-
ney's fees, and damages awarded against the seller in a products liability claim.47
However, the seller is not entitled to indemnity if the seller played a significant
role in the design or manufacture of the aspect of the product that caused the
damage, or altered the product in such a way that the alteration was a significant
causal factor of the injury, or had knowledge of the defect, or made an express
factual representation about that aspect of the product that caused the injury.48
The seller must give prompt notice of the suit within thirty days of the filing of
the complaint against the seller in order to maintain a claim for indemnity. 9
D. The Scope of This Article
This Article will explore, in two parts, the meaning and effect of the changes
wrought by the new legislation and make suggestions for improvement or correc-
tions to the legislation. Part I of this Article will address the threshold issues of
what a product is, who is liable, who may sue, what interests are protected, and
what the term "unreasonably dangerous" means. Part II will explore the cate-
gories of defects created by the Act, the liability of manufacturers and sellers for
the various categories of defects, defenses available to products liability claims,
and indemnity claims for sellers.
II. TERMS OF ART USED IN THE STATUTE
The Mississippi Products Liability Act of 1993 addresses the liability of manu-
facturers and sellers for damages to claimants caused by defective products that
are unreasonably dangerous. The Act does not define the terms "product," "man-
ufacturer," "seller," "claimant," or "unreasonably dangerous," yet each of the
terms is important to the proper understanding and application of the Act. Since
the legislature chose not to define these terms, the courts will likely interpret the
terms in a manner that is consistent with the use of these terms in the common
law of products liability in Mississippi. To the extent that the courts have not
defined the terms through the existing case law, the courts must develop the defi-
nitions as cases arise, absent further legislative action to provide such defini-
tions.
47. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(g)(ii) (Supp. 1995). The Act provides:
The manufacturer of a product who is found liable for a defective product pursuant to Section l(a)
shall indemnify a product seller for the costs of litigation, any reasonable expenses, reasonable attor-
ney's fees and any damages awarded by the trier of fact unless the seller exercised substantial control
over that aspect of the design, testing, manufacture, packaging or labeling of the product that caused
the harm for which recovery of damages is sought; the seller altered or modified the product, and
the alteration or modification was a substantial factor in causing the harm for which recovery of
damages is sought; the seller had actual knowledge of the defective condition of the product at the
time he supplied same; or the seller made an express factual representation about the aspect of the
product which caused the harm for which recovery of damages is sought.
Id.
48. Id.
49. MISS. CODE ANN. § 1 I-l-63(g)(ii) (Supp. 1995).
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A. What Is a Product?
Because the Act does not define the term "product," one must look to the com-
mon law of Mississippi to understand the term. However, the case law of
Mississippi does not provide a comprehensive definition of the term. The
Mississippi Supreme Court, like most courts, has shaped the concept of product
on a case-by-case basis 0 and has not had occasion to comprehensively define the
limits of the concept of product. Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts,5 1 which has been the source of much of the products liability law in
Mississippi, 2 also does not define the term product.
In general, "products liability law concerns... chattels and personal property,
and deals with alleged design, manufacturing and warnings defects in such per-
sonal property."5 3 However, American courts have not developed a universally
accepted definition of product.54 As reflected by Tentative Draft No. 2 of the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, the courts have not restricted
the term to include only personal property.5 5 The Tentative Draft defines a prod-
uct as "something distributed commercially for use or consumption,"5 " further
explaining that "[m]ost but not necessarily all products are tangible personal
property; most have been subjected to processing and fabricating prior to enter-
ing the stream of commerce; and most pass through a commercial chain of distri-
bution before ultimate use and consumption.""
One area of particular concern in the judicially developed concept of product
involves the status of chattels that become incorporated into improvements to
real property. Initially, as shown by State Stove Manufacturing Co. v. Hodges,8
the Mississippi Supreme Court considered items attached to improvements to
real estate (fixtures) to be products for purposes of assessing the liability of man-
ufacturers.5 9 Later cases, however, seem to have reversed course and now
exclude installed fixtures from the concept of product, based only upon a statute
50. IA Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5.09 (1995) [hereinafter FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN].
51. Section 402A, supra note 5.
52. See, e.g., State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 923 (1966).
53. IA FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 50, § 5.09[1] (footnotes omitted). The Model Uniform Product
Liability Act defines product as "any object possessing intrinsic value, capable of delivery either as an assem-
bled whole or as a component part or parts, and produced for introduction into trade or commerce" excluding
human tissue and organs, including blood products. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, § 102(C), 44
Fed. Reg. 62714, 62717 (Dep't. Commerce 1979) [hereinafter MODEL ACT).
54. 1A FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 50, § 5.02.
55. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 4 cmts. b & e, reporters note, cmt. e (Tentative
Draft No. 2, 1995) [hereinafter TENTATIVE DRAFT] (pointing out the more recent trend among courts to treat
sellers of improved real property as product sellers in a number of circumstances, such as mass-produced hous-
ing, and prefabricated buildings).
56. Id. § 4.
57. Id. Human blood and tissue and services are excluded from coverage of the TENTATIVE DRAFT. Id. §
4(b)-(c). In the past, courts were reluctant to impose strict liability on sellers of improvements to real property.
Some courts, however, have extended the concept of product to include strict liability to include improvements
to real property. See id., reporters note, cmt. e. However, the majority rule is that a product incorporated into
an improvement to real property does not lose its identity as a product for purposes of liability to the seller. Id.
58. 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1966).
59. State Stove, 189 So. 2d 113.
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of repose that sets the time limit for actions based on deficiencies in construction
of improvements to real property,6" but which does not address any particular
theory of liability in setting the time limit.
6 1
In the 1966 case of State Stove, the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, in part. 2 The case involved
a hot water heater in the plaintiffs' home that exploded causing damage to the
home and personal property in it.6 The homeowners sued the manufacturer of
the water heater and the contractors who built the home.64 The court found that
the facts did not support imposition of liability in this case, but, nevertheless,
announced the adoption of Section 402A as it applies "to . . .manufacturer[s]
and to ... contractor[s] who build ... and sell house[s] with ... product[s] in
[them]. ''65 The court clearly considered the water heater, a fixture or improve-
ment to real property, to be a product. Thus, from State Stove, one would con-
clude the term product included fixtures.
In 1966 the legislature enacted a statute providing a time limit for bringing
actions for damage caused by patent deficiencies in the construction or improve-
ment of real property.66 This statute of repose does not specify the causes of
action, but merely provides a limitation on the time within which a plaintiff
could bring an action for injury following acceptance of the construction.
Nevertheless, apparently from this statute, as subsequently amended,68 a rule
evolved in the Mississippi cases that suppliers of component parts incorporated
into real property are not subject to strict products liability.69 This evolution has
occurred despite the fact that the statute does not adopt or impose a cause of
action for deficiencies in improvements to real property and despite the declara-
tion of the Mississippi Supreme Court in State Stove that strict liability would
apply to manufacturers of products and builder-vendors of homes containing
products, presumably including those products incorporated into real property as
fixtures.
60. MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-41 (Supp. 1984).
61. See infra notes 80-94, 126-30 and accompanying text.
62. State Stove, 189 So. 2d at 118.
63. Id. at 114.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 118.
66. Act of June 15, 1966, S.B. 1652, 1966 Miss. Laws ch. 397 (current version at Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-
41 (1995)). As enacted in 1966, the statute stated in pertinent part:
No action to recover damages for injury to property, real or personal, or for an injury to the person,
or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of any patent deficiency in the design, planning,
supervision or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property, nor
any action for contribution or indemnity for damages sustained on account of such injury except by
prior written agreement to the contrary, may be brought against any person, firm or corporation per-
forming or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of construction or construction of such
improvement to real property more than ten (10) years after the written acceptance of such construc-
tion by the owner pursuant to the performance or furnishing of such services and construction.
Id.
67. Id.
68. MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-41 (1955). As subsequently amended, the statute now provides that it applies to
any deficiency, including latent ones, see Deville Furniture Co. v. Jesco, Inc., 423 So. 2d 1337, 1340-41 (Miss.
1982); that it does not apply to claims for wrongful death; and that the limitations period is now "six (6) years
after the written acceptance or actual occupancy or use, which ever occurs first." Id.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 81-100.
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In 1973, in the case of Hamilton Fixture Co. v. Anderson,0 without reference to
the 1996 statute of repose, the court again applied products liability rules to a
claim involving a fixture, specifically one involving defective component parts
of a heating and air conditioning system installed in a new home.71 The humidi-
fier, manufactured by the defendant and installed with the central air and heat
system of the plaintiffs' home, malfunctioned and caused property damage to the
home.7 ' The supreme court approved the trial court's instructions based on the
theory of strict liability in tort and its refusal to give negligence instructions
requested by the defendant. No one raised the issue of whether the humidifier
was a product as opposed to an improvement to real property.73
The following year, in the case of Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., the court held
that a builder-vendor is not liable under strict liability in tort or under products
liability law to remote purchasers of a permanent structure on real estate. 71 The
plaintiffs were remote purchasers of a house that developed cracks in the floor
and walls six months after their purchase. 7' They alleged that the cracks resulted
from faulty construction by the defendant contractors.77 Justice Smith, writing
for the court, with five justices specially concurring, 78 distinguished the claim in
Oliver from claims such as in State Stove, in part because Oliver was "not a case
where injury or damage has been caused by a defective [sic] manufactured prod-
uct installed in a building."79 In other words, the claim involved defective work-
manship in the construction of a permanent structure, not defective products
used in the construction. Oliver supports the proposition that buildings or per-
manent improvements to real property are not products under Mississippi law,
but that fixtures installed in a building are nevertheless products.80
70. 285 So. 2d 744 (Miss. 1973).
71. Id. at 747.
72. Id. at 745-46.
73. The house was completed in 1965, and the damages occurred in 1966. Id. at 745. The opinion does not
disclose the date the suit was filed, but presumably it was filed timely under either the general statute of limita-
tions, MISS. CODE ANN. § 722 (1942) (current version at MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-49 (1995)) or the statute of
repose, Act of June 15, 1966, S.B. 1652, 1966 Miss. Laws ch. 397 (current version at Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-
41 (1995)). Thus, whether the claim was governed by the general statute of limitations or the statute of repose
was not at issue.
74. 303 So. 2d 466 (Miss. 1974).
75. Id. at 469.
76. Id. at 466.
77. Id.
78. Id. A majority of the court specially concurred in order to express the opinion that Justice Smith's opin-
ion tended to leave little room for an implied warranty between the builder-vendor of a home and the first pur-
chaser. Id. The application of implied warranty as a basis of liability for claims by the first purchaser of a new
home was affirmed in Brown v. Elton Chalk, Inc., 358 So. 2d 721 (Miss. 1978). In Keyes v. Guy Bailey
Homes, Inc., 439 So. 2d 670 (Miss. 1983), the court extended the builder-vendor's liability and held that a
builder-vendor of a home may be found liable to remote purchasers for negligence or the breach of implied
warranty without privity. Id. at 671. Brown and Keyes were not treated as products liability cases.
79. Oliver v. City Builders, 303 So. 2d 466, 468 (Miss. 1974).
80. This approach is consistent with that taken by a majority of courts. See TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note
55, § 4 reporter's note, cmt. e. See also Brown v. Williams, 504 So. 2d 1188 (Miss. 1987). In Brown, the plain-
tiff complained that a piece of equipment called an elevator, used in the process of setting casing on an oil well,
was defective and that the manufacturer was strictly liable for plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 1189. The court, apply-
ing Section 402A, affirmed the chancellor's findings that the manufacturer did not negligently design or negli-
gently manufacture the product and that the manufacturer did not breach any duty to warn. Id. at 1191-92. The
court also found that the plaintiff did not make out his case to support a claim based in strict products liability.
Id. The court, however, did not discuss whether the elevator was a product or an improvement to real property.
In a later case, Holifield v. Pitts Swabbing Co., 533 So. 2d 1112 (Miss. 1988), the court decided that a wellhead
of an oil well is not a product. Id. at 1115.
[VOL. 16:2
TORT REFORM IN MISSISSIPPI
In Smith v. Fluor Corp. ,81 the plaintiff, an oil refinery worker, sought to recov-
er for injuries received in an explosion at the refinery.82 The plaintiff alleged that
the contractor who built the plant "'negligently and defectively designed, manu-
factured and installed"' the heat exchanger and associated pipes and valves.83
The defendants contended that since the explosion and injuries occurred more
than ten years after the construction of the plant and the installation of the heat
exchanger, the claim was time-barred.84 The court agreed, finding that the heat
exchanger was an improvement to real property under the statute, thus the claim
was untimely.8" The court did not discuss whether the appropriate theory of
recovery was products liability, breach of warranty, or general negligence,
because the plaintiff brought the claim under a negligence theory only.8
Prior to the 1988 case of Moore v. Jesco, Inc.,87 the court had not indicated that
products liability claims did not cover defective chattels incorporated into
improvements to real property, although the statute of repose governing claims
for improvements to real property did cover materials used in construction of
such improvements. Oliver implied that the court would not treat a claim for
defective workmanship in the construction of a permanent structure as a products
liability claim, because the buildings are not products, although it would apply
products liability rules to products installed in buildings.' Fluor Corp. decided
that the statute of repose for claims involving defective improvements to real
property protects manufacturers of products incorporated into real property as
improvements.89 However, in what is arguably a misapplication of the statute of
repose, the court in Moore made a leap beyond Fluor Corp. and held that com-
ponent parts of an improvement to real property are not subject to products lia-
bility claims.9
In Moore, the plaintiffs were poultry farmers who bought a number of steel
buildings for use as chicken houses. 1 Two of the defendants designed the struc-
tures that a third defendant constructed. 2 The plaintiffs alleged that the defen-
dants had defectively designed, manufactured, and constructed the buildings and
had failed to warn.9 3 The plaintiffs brought the claims on alternative theories of
negligence, strict liability, breach of contract, and breach of warranties.94 From
the facts set forth in the court's opinion, the plaintiffs did not make allegations
81. 514 So. 2d 1227 (Miss. 1987).
82. Id. at 1228-29.
83. Id. at 1228.
84. Id. at 1229. The defendants relied on the Act of April 19, 1972, H.B. 144, 1972 Miss. Laws, ch. 350
(providing an applicable time period of 10 years) (current version at Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-41 (1995) (pro-
viding a 6 year time period)).
85. Smith v Fluor Corp., 514 So. 2d 1227, 1230-31 (Miss. 1987).
86. Id. at 1228.
87. 531 So. 2d 815 (Miss. 1988).
88. Oliver v. City Builders, Inc., 303 So. 2d 466, 468 (Miss. 1974).
89. Fluor Corp., 514 So. 2d at 1230-31.
90. Moore, 531 So. 2dat 817.
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that component parts were defectively designed or manufactured." Instead, they
contended that the overall design was inadequate and that there was a lack of
workmanship in the construction. The defendants moved for summary judg-
ment since the buildings had been completed and occupied for more than 10
years prior to the suit, and thus, the statute of repose barred the claims." The cir-
cuit court agreed and granted summary judgment for the defendants. 8
On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the statute of repose did not protect
the defendants as suppliers and materialmen 9 The court disagreed and, relying
on Fluor Corp., held that the statute of repose protects suppliers of materials for
use in improvements to real property and that an action for strict liability will not
lie because such component parts are not products. 00
The Moore opinion, which addressed the applicable theory of liability in dicta
because a decision on the theory of liability was not necessary to the decision,
appears to conflict with earlier decisions.1"1 Moreover, Fluor Corp., upon which
Moore relied, did not state a rule with respect to the applicable theories of liabili-
ty for claims involving improvements to real property. Fluor Corp. only held
that the statute of repose applies to items of property classified as improvements
to real property,102 and thus, claims against manufacturers or suppliers involving
such items are subject to the statute. The court in Moore never indicated whether
the plaintiffs complained that the individually manufactured component parts
were defective in design or manufacture. Absent a contention by the plaintiffs,
the court had no need to reach the issue of whether a plaintiff may brig an prod-
ucts liability claim against the manufacturer or seller of a component part used in
the construction of an improvement to real property. Under the rule of Fluor
Corp., the court could apply the statute of repose to suppliers of component parts
incorporated into an improvement to real property without limiting the theory of
liability to negligence or breach of warranty.
If Moore truly bars plaintiffs from bringing products liability claims against
suppliers of defective products incorporated into improvements to real property,
the court has overruled State Stove in part because, under that case, strict prod-




98. Id. at 815.
99. Id. at817.
100. Id.
101. But see Wolfe v. Dal-Tile Corp. 876 E Supp. 116, 121 n.5 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (considering this rule to be
a holding and not dicta, even though the holding was not necessary).
102. Smith v. Fluor Corp., 514 So. 2d 1227, 1230 (Miss. 1987). Whether Fluor Corp. is a correct application
of the statute of repose to suppliers is debatable as well. It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully explore
the application of the statute of repose to protect manufacturers and sellers of items incorporated into improve-
ments to real property, but one could easily conclude that such defendants are outside the scope of the statute.
See Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Chief Indus., Inc., 612 E Supp. 1179 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (refusing to
apply IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20-2 (Bums 1986), a statute of repose substantially the same in the scope of its
protection as that of Mississippi, to a claim against a manufacturer of an item incorporated into an improvement
to real property).
103. See Wolfe v. Dal-Tile, 876 F. Supp. 116, 121 n. 5 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (expressing doubt that the Moore
court intended to make such a departure from the well-settled case law of Mississippi allowing claims against
fixture manufacturers, and recognizing that the statute of repose does not compel such a result, but nevertheless
following the Moore rule).
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a house, such as in State Stove,"°4 is a fixture and an improvement to real proper-
ty, then under the reasoning of Moore, strict products liability is not applicable
because the water heater is not a product, whether the defendant is the manufac-
turer, wholesaler, or builder-vendor.
The Moore court, without engaging in any analysis of the policy underlying its
decision, abolished strict products liability for a wide range of products that
become fixtures incorporated into buildings and other real property, even as to
the manufacturers and sellers of those products who sold the products as
chattels.1"5 The opinion provides no insight as to the basis for the distinction
between products and component parts incorporated into improvements to real
property, particularly in determining the appropriate theory upon which to base a
claim. The opinion fails to articulate any basis for concluding that the statute of
repose in any way requires that a plaintiff's cause of action for injury caused by
component parts of a building must be based only in negligence or warranty and
bars the application of products liability theory to component parts after incorpo-
ration.
The lack of support for a conclusion that the statute of repose imposes a partic-
ular theory of liability can be demonstrated by the approach of other courts to the
issue of which theories of liability are applicable to claims arising from the
defective construction of buildings. Although courts have traditionally not
imposed strict products liability rules on sellers of real estate,1"6 some courts in
other jurisdictions have treated buildings as products in the context of mass-pro-
duced homes"07 or prefabricated buildings.10 8 Several other courts have treated
other types of permanent improvements as products as well." 9 Nothing in the
statute of repose dictates the theory of liability underlying a claim or bars
Mississippi courts from considering permanent improvements to real property to
be subject to the rules of products liability. Whether products liability rules
should apply to buildings and fixtures or attachments should be decided on the
basis of the policy underlying the purpose of products liability rules, 1 not on the
basis of a statute that neither expressly nor implicitly addresses the applicable
theory or theories of liability.
104. State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1966). In State
Stove, the court applied strict products liability rules to determine liability in a claim alleging that a defective
water heater installed by the builder-vendor in the home purchased by the plaintiffs. Id.
105. Compare Moore with Ferguson v. Modern Farm Sys., Inc., 555 N.E.2d 1379 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). In
Ferguson, the court treated a prefabricated ladder attached to a grain bin as a product, declining to apply the
statute of repose for improvements to real property to bar the complaint. Id. The statute of repose involved,
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20-2 (Bums 1986), is essentially the same as Mississippi's. The Indiana court did not
view the statute of repose as taking component parts manufactured for incorporation into real property out of
the purview of products liability rules for defects in the product as manufactured. Ferguson, 555 N.E.2d at
1379.
106. TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 55, § 4 reporter's note cmt. e.
107. See, e.g., Kreigler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969), and Schipper v. Levitt
& Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. 1965).
108. See, e.g., Bastian v. Wausas Homes, Inc., 620 E Supp. 947 (N.D. 111. 1985) (applying Illinois law).
109. See, e.g., Patitucci v. Drelich, 379 A.2d 297, 298 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977).
110. See Trent v. Brasch Mfg. Co., 477 N.E.2d 1312, 1315 (I11. Ct. App. 1985) (distinguishing, based on poli-
cy considerations, between a house, not a product, and attachments to it such as a heating and air conditioning
system, a product).
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The rule stated in Moore is a non sequitur to the extent that the rule is based
either on the statute of repose or Fluor Corp.. The statute's exemption of wrong-
ful death actions from the limitation further supports the view that the applica-
tion of the statute of repose to manufacturers of component parts is a separate
issue from the appropriate theory of recovery.111 The Moore court seemed per-
suaded that because the statute is broad enough to cover claims against manufac-
turers and suppliers of component parts or fixtures installed in improvements to
real property, such items cannot be considered products in determining the
appropriate theory of liability. However, since the statute does not expressly gov-
ern wrongful death claims," 2 the question of how to treat such items in a wrong-
ful death claim remains open. The exemption calls into serious question an inter-
pretation that requires the imposition of a particular theory of liability by the
statute. The statute and the prior cases simply do not support the court's conclu-
sion that manufactured items that are fixtures or that are incorporated into
improvements to real property are not products. " 3
Application of the Moore rule may lead to anomalous results. For example, a
defective light fixture used in a recreational mobile home or camper would quali-
fy as a defective product. If the plaintiff can show mismanufacture, the liability
would be strict for the manufacturer and sellers of the fixture and of the vehi-
cle. " 4 However, if the same defective fixture were permanently attached to the
ceiling or wall of a house, strict products liability would not apply since the fix-
ture would not be a product because i i Js an improvement to real pr1.ope. 1-,
While a fixture might be an improvement to real property for purposes of the
statute of repose in claims against builders and designers of improvements to real
property, the court should, nevertheless, treat a fixture as a product in determin-
ing the theory of liability against fixture manufacturers and sellers. " The
results of an artificial distinction between fixtures and products are inconsistent
with the concepts and policies behind the strict liability theory adopted by
Mississippi under the common law to the extent that it is retained under the Act.
In State Stove, the court had no problem in applying strict liability to manufac-
turers of fixtures for damages caused by defects in such fixtures, though attached
to an improvement to real property." 7 The court cited the seminal case recogniz-
11. MISS. CODE ANN. § 15-1-41 (1995).
112. Id.
113. In Phipps v. Irby Construction Co., 636 So. 2d 353 (Miss. 1993), the court held that § 15-1-41 did not
violate equal protection in exempting wrongful death actions from the statute of repose's time limits. Justice
McRae, in dissenting, argued that a worker exposed to asbestos in a building would be barred by the statute of
repose if the injury occurred and suit brought after the statutory period had passed, but a worker exposed to
asbestos on a ship would not be affected by the statute of repose. Id. at 364. Whether this argument is success-
ful in showing that the statute violates equal protection, the illustration does show the lack of principled distinc-
tion between the two cases without more careful analysis of the policy underlying the distinction.
114. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a) (Supp. 1995).
115. Cf Phipps v. Irby Construction Co., 636 So. 2d 353, 354 (Miss. 1993) (citing a number of cases from
other jurisdictions finding various pieces of machinery to be improvements to real property).
116. The majority rule in the United States is that a manufacturer of a product is liable for damages caused by
a defect in the product even if the product is incorporated into an improvement to real property. TENTATIVE
DRAFr, supra note 55, § 4 reporter's note cmt. e.
117. State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1966).
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ing strict liability for manufacturers of products, Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc.,118 in support of its decision to adopt Section 402A.'19 In particu-
lar, the State Stove court relied on the language of Greenman that "'[t]he purpose
of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries are borne by the manufac-
turers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons
who are powerless to protect themselves."' 20 The reporters for the Tentative
Draft have pointed out that as to manufacturing (or deviation) defects, several
reasons have been advanced for the imposition of strict liability: (1) the difficul-
ty of proving the existence of negligence of the manufacturer; (2) the disappoint-
ment of reasonable expectations of the product's performance; and (3) the distri-
bution of the burden of unavoidable loss through pricing mechanisms.12
The policies which underlie the imposition of strict liability for deviation
defects in chattels generally apply equally to mass-manufactured fixtures. No
reasoned basis for a distinction as to the theory of liability of the fixture manu-
facturer or seller exists simply because the fixture is incorporated into a chattel
as opposed to a house. The defective fixtures are likely to be mass-manufactured
and to cause loss of the same degree or worse as other items treated as products.
The consumer's expectations are not likely to be less than they are for other prod-
ucts, and proof of deviation defects is not likely to be any easier. The classifica-
tion of an item as a fixture will not likely affect the distribution of losses in any
significant way through the pricing mechanism. The new Act continues to
require strict liability for deviation defects. 22 Protection of manufacturers of
mass-manufactured fixtures from strict liability simply on the basis of incorpora-
tion into an improvement to real property does not seem to rest on the promotion
of any rational policy, and the statute of repose does not compel such a result.123
Arguments certainly exist that those who construct improvements to real prop-
erty and those who design, supervise, or observe such construction should not be
subject to strict products liability rules. 24 Builders who construct one building
at a time do not easily compare to mass manufacturers of products. Costs are
less predictable on a project by project basis than for mass-produced products. 25
Buildings are less likely to be standardized, and the owner who hires the contrac-
tor is likely to have significant influence in design and construction. 26 Quality
118. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1962).
119. State Stove, 189 So. 2dat 120.
120. Id. at 120 (quoting Greenman, 377 P.2d at 900-901).
121. TENTATIVE DRAF, supra note 55, § 1 cmt. a.
122. MIss. CODE ANN. § ll-l-63(a)(i)(1) (Supp. 1995).
123. See Wolfe v. Dal-Tile, 876 F Supp. 116, 121 n.5 (S.D. Miss. 1995) (expressing doubt that the Moore
court intended to make such a departure from the well-settled case law of Mississippi allowing claims against
fixture manufacturers, and recognizing that the statute of repose does not compel such a result, but nevertheless
following the Moore rule).
124. See Edie Lindsay, Comment, Strict Liability and the Building Industry, 33 EMORY L. J. 175, 197-200
(1984) (examining the differences between improvements to real property and mass-produced products). Some
courts, however have applied strict liability to builders of mass-produced housing. E.g., Schipper v. Levit &
Sons, Inc., 207 A.2d 314 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1965) (applying strict liability to a mass-builder for injuries caused by a
defectively designed water distribution system).
125. Lindsay, supra note 124, at 197-98.
126. Id. at 189-90.
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control is more difficult because of the nature of construction.'27 Soil conditions
vary from site to site.1 28 The relationship between the contractor and architect
hired to do the job is more in the nature of a service contract than is the typical
purchase of a mass-produced product.
129
However, these arguments are not persuasive when applied to makers of mass-
produced fixtures that are defective when the manufacturer places them into the
stream of commerce.13 Mass producers of fixtures are more like mass producers
of manufactured products than like building contractors or architects. The poli-
cies of loss distribution through pricing, avoidance of undue difficulty of proof
of defect, and avoidance of disappointment of reasonable consumer expectations
apply equally to manufacturers of fixtures. The language of the statute of repose
does not address these policies and nothing in the statute bars the application of
strict liability to manufacturers of fixtures produced for incorporation into
improvements to real property.
31
The federal courts have followed Moore in protecting fixture manufacturers
from products liability claims, both by applying the statute of repose to protect
manufacturers from untimely claims and by refusing to apply strict products lia-
bility rules to them when the products have been incorporated into an improve-
ment to real property. In Trust Company Bank v. United States Gypsum Co.,132
the Fifth Circuit recognized that the effect given by the Mississippi Supreme
Court to the statute of repose is to protect manufacturers of materials incorporat-
ed into improvements to real property.'33 In Wolfe v. Dal-Tile Corp.,.34 the feder-
al district court held that the statute of repose protected the manufacturer of floor
tile used in an improvement to real property only if the supplier provided the
design, planning, or construction of an improvement to real property.1 3' The
court went further and, while soundly criticizing Moore, nevertheless applied it
to find that the manufacturer was not subject to strict liability because the floor
tile upon which the plaintiff slipped and fell was not a product, but an improve-
ment to real property.'36
The comments to the Tentative Draft No. 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability recognize that in recent years courts have treated builder-ven-
dors, manufacturers, and distributors of fixtures and appliances contained in a
home as product sellers subject to product liability claims, even if the product
has otherwise become a fixture or attachment to the improvement to real proper-
127. Id. at 188-89.
128. Id. at 189.
129. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 35, § 104A, at 724.
130. Lindsay, supra note 124, at 180 n.29.
131. In actuality, the statute does not bar the application of strict liability to anyone involved in the construc-
tion process should the court decide to impose strict liability. The statute does not address theories of liability.
However, under current Mississippi common law, negligence and breach of implied warranty are the appropri-
ate theories for recovery for defects in construction created by the builder-vendor of improvements to real prop-
erty. Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, Inc., 439 So. 2d 670, 673 (Miss. 1983). Presumably the same theories would
apply to sellers or suppliers of component parts incorporated into improvements.
132. 950 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1992).
133. Id. at 1151.
134. 876 F Supp. 116 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
135. Id. at 120-121.
136. Id. at 121 n.5.
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ty.'37 The comments also recognize that some courts have considered a building
itself as a product when built as part of a mass housing project.138 Especially as
to the treatment of fixtures, if Mississippi continues to follow the approach of
Moore, it will be outside the mainstream of American products liability law.
Certainly not all states treat component parts incorporated into real property as
products after the incorporation occurs. Indiana, for example, statutorily defined
the term product to mean "any item or good that is personalty at the time it is
conveyed by the seller to another party."1 9 As pointed out by Frumer and
Friedman, "it is clear that the [Indiana] product liability act would not apply to a
house... nor would it be applicable.., to a... window frame that might have
been personalty when sold to the home . . . builder, but clearly would not be
when the house was sold to the home buyer." 4" Nevertheless, an item that is a
product before installation remains a product for liability purposes after installa-
tion as to a seller or manufacturer who sold the product prior to its installation.41 '
As noted, Mississippi, unlike Indiana and a number of other states with prod-
ucts liability statutes, 42 did not define the term "product" in its Products
Liability Act. Likewise Mississippi's statute of repose for claims arising from
improvements to real property did not define "product" for the purpose of deter-
mining what theories of liability plaintiffs may use. The definition of "product"
ought still to be an open question in Mississippi, to be resolved in appropriate
cases properly presented, argued, and considered, rather than decided by dicta
without analysis and by deference to a statute which on its face does not address
the issue.' 43 Since the legislature has seen fit to codify Mississippi products lia-
bility law, the preferable course is for the legislature to carefully define "prod-
uct" by amendment. This author suggests that the definition should include
manufactured chattels or goods, including chattels or goods that form component
parts of or that are incorporated into another product or improvement to real
property.
44
137. TENTATIVE DRAFr, supra note 55, § 4 cmt. e. See also id., reporters note cmt. e ("The majority of courts
hold that a defective product that is incorporated into an improvement to realty does not lose its identity as a
product and that a manufacturer or contractor may be strictly liable for any damages proximately caused by the
defect.").
138. Id.
139. IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5.2 (Burns 1992).
140. IA FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 50, § 5.09[2].
141. Sapp v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 973 F.2d 539 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying the Indiana Product Liability Act,
IND. CODE § 33-1-52 (West 1991)); Ferguson v. Modern Farm Sys., Inc., 555 N.E.2d 1379 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
142. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53(3) (West 1991) (defining product as "corporeal movable that
is manufactured for placement into trade or commerce, including a product that forms a component part of or
that is subsequently incorporated into another product or an immovable"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(5)
(1980) (defining product as "any tangible object or goods produced").
143. It is beyond the scope of this Article to fully flesh out the definition of product and the relationship of
products liability to real estate. State courts have reached varying results in dealing with the issue. See 1A
FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 50, § 5.09[21-[3]. In Abdul-Warith v. Arthur G. McKee & Co., 488 E Supp.
306, 312 (E.D. Pa. 1980), the court held that whether an item is a fixture and attached to real property is not
determinative of whether the item is a product for purposes of Section 402A.
144. Cf LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.53(3) (West 1991).
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Other questions also remain in the law of Mississippi about the scope of the
term "product" in products liability law. Courts are divided as to whether a live
animal is a product for this purpose"5-an issue that the Mississippi Supreme
Court has not yet addressed. Processing and distributing blood and blood prod-
ucts are clearly outside the scope of products liability rules because the legisla-
ture has designated such activities as services, not sales. 4 However, the statute
does not cover other tissues from human147 or animal sources 148 and the court has
not yet resolved whether these items may be treated as products. 49 There can be
little doubt that "product" includes manufactured chattels or manufactured items
of personalty, but whether the concept of product extends beyond such items is
still largely open in Mississippi.
B. Who is a Manufacturer?
The Act governs liability of manufacturers and sellers of defective products."'
The specific mention of both manufacturer and seller is a departure from the
language of Section 402A, which only pertains to commercial sellers, including
manufacturers."' Part II of this Article will explore more fully whether the dis-
tinction between manufacturers and sellers in the new statute has significance
for purposes other than indemnification." 2 Despite an evident intent to distin-
guish between manufacturers and sellers, the Act did not define the term "man-
ufacturer."
Not unt'I 1995 did the Mississippi Supreme Court define the term "manufa-
Ntut Uule II pI%_ UeI lln LIIr, lllalli l nufa-
turer" for the purposes of strict liability under Section 402A. In Scordino v.
Hopeman Brothers, Inc.,"53 the plaintiffs, employees of a shipbuilder, sued a sub-
contractor who installed asbestos wall paneling (manufactured by others) in a
ship under construction." The plaintiffs alleged that their exposure to asbestos
dust during the installation of the paneling caused lung damage.' The plaintiffs
145. Compare Beyer v. Aquarium Supply Co., 404 N.Y.S.2d 778 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (applying strict prod-
ucts liability to hamsters) with Anderson v. Farmers Hybrid Cos., 408 N.E.2d 1194 (I11. App. Ct. 1980) (finding
that a gilt, an unbred female pig, is not a product) and Whitmer v. Schneble, 331 N.E.2d 115 (I11. App. Ct. 1975)
(finding that a dog is not a product). See also TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 55, § 4 cmt. b.
146. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-1 (1993).
147. Besides blood products, several states have excluded human tissue and organs from the application of
products liability law. E.g., IDAHO CODE § 6-1402 (1990); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.52(3) (West 1991).
See also TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 55, § 4(c).
148. See, e.g., Two Rivers Co. v. Curtis Breeding Serv., 624 F.2d 1242 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
920 (198 1) (holding that under Texas law, bull semen used for artificial insemination is not a product).
149. For discussion of various treatments given to books and other printed material and other situations
arguably covered by products liability law, see 1A FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 50, § 5.02.
150. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a) (Supp. 1995).
151. Section 402A, supra note 5, cmt. f.
152. As PART II of this Article will suggest, in dealing with liability for various categories of defects, the dis-
tinction between the two categories of defendants identified in the statute may be important. For example, the
statute appears to mean that a seller is liable only if it knew or should have known of a danger presented by a
defect in design regardless of what the manufacturer knew or should have known. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-
63(f)(i) (Supp. 1995). Moreover, to the extent that indemnification is at issue, the classification of a party as
seller or manufacturer is significant. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-63-1(g) (Supp. 1995).
153. 662 So. 2d 640 (Miss. 1995).
154. Id. at 642, 645.
155. Id. at 642.
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contended that the subcontractor was strictly liable as the seller of the paneling
for failure to warn of the dangers from the installation.156  In deciding that the
subcontractor was not a seller because it merely supplied materials in connection
with a service, the court also stated that "it necessarily follows that [the subcon-
tractor] is not a manufacturer."157 In reaching this conclusion, the court defined a
manufacturer as one who "produces goods as a principal part of its business and
sells them either directly or for resale to the consuming public.
15 8
In general, under the Act, and consistent with the definition in Scordino, and as
widely understood elsewhere, one would expect a manufacturer to be the person
or enterprise that fabricates, constructs, or assembles a product for introduction
into the stream of commerce and is in the business of doing so. 15 9 For example,
as used in the Model Act, "[t]he term encompasses those product sellers who ini-
tiate and carry out the process of production. It also includes manufacturers of
component parts . . . and those product sellers who rebuild or remanufacture
products for resale 'in like new' condition."16 0  States that have statutorily
defined the term "manufacturer" have tended to define the term as "the designer,
fabricator, producer, compounder, processor, assembler, . . . constructor, maker,
remanufacturer, rebuilder, refurnisher, reconditioner of a product, or a person or
entity which 'otherwise prepares' a product, prior to its sale to a user or con-
sumer.""16 Presumably, the Mississippi legislature did not intend to change the
requirement that a "manufacturer" be one who is in the business of manufactur-
ing, as opposed to the parishioner who bakes a cake for sale at the occasional
church bake sale. There is no reason to believe that the legislature intended to
depart from the traditional application of strict products liability as applied by
the Mississippi Supreme Court to only commercial sellers and manufacturers.162
While Section 402A used the term "seller" as an inclusive term for persons in
the chain of distribution, "providing for the potential liability of manufacturers
and assemblers of completed products was the raison d'9tre of strict liability and
the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A."' 3 Initially, in adopting
Section 402A, the Mississippi Supreme Court restricted its application to manu-
facturers and to those sellers who do more than simply pass along new products
without inspection. 1 4  However, it appears that in subsequent cases the court
abandoned the limitation bringing Mississippi fully in line with Section 402A so
that sellers (including retailers and wholesalers) are liable strictly for defective
156. Id.
157. Id. at 645.
158. Id.
159. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 395, cmt. b (quoted in Scordino v. Hopeman Brothers, Inc., 662
So. 2d 640, 645 (Miss. 1995)); Section 402A, supra note 5, cmt. f; TENTATIVE DRATvr, supra note 55, § I cmt. c.
160. MODEL ACT, supra note 53, § 102(B).
161. IA FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 50, § 5.05.
162. See Section 402A, supra note 5, cmt. f; TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 55, § I cmt. c (also retaining this
concept).
163. IA FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 50, § 5.05.
164. Compare State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1966)
(contractor-seller found to be strictly liable in connection with the sale and installation of a defective water
heater) with Sam Shainberg Co. v. Barlow, 258 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1972) (shoe retailer who sold shoes without
inspection found not to be strictly liable). See infra text accompanying notes 237-46.
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products whether or not acting as a mere sales conduit under the law prior to the
Act. 165
In most cases, determining who is a manufacturer does not present serious
problems in the application of the Act. However, some unresolved problems
remain. For instance, the proper application of the Act to a seller who sells prod-
ucts as his own, although he did not actually manufacture the product, is not
immediately clear. Prior to Scordino, the court had dealt only once with the issue
of whether such a defendant was a manufacturer for purposes of strict products
liability claims. In Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Reeves,'66 flying glass injured the
plaintiff when a soft drink bottle broke after it fell from a defective cardboard
carton."6 7 The court treated the bottler of the soft drink as the manufacturer of
the carton on the basis that the bottler distributed the carton as the bottler's
own. 8 The court reached this result in an effort to impose liability on a seller
without expressly overruling the rule set forth in Sam Shainberg Co. v. Barlow,
169
a decision that provided that nonmanufacturer sellers are not strictly liable under
products liability theory for defective products.170 Whether the new Act would
lead to the same result is an open question.
A straightforward application of Section 402A renders unnecessary such a rule
treating sellers as manufacturers because, under Section 402A, all commercial
sellers, including nonmanufacturers, are strictly liable for product defects.71' The
courts must decide in future cases whether the Act includes as manufacturers
those sellers who market products as their own. 2 The absence of any definition
of the term "manufacturer" leaves the issue open.
The indemnity provision of the Act suggests an answer to the question of how
to treat the seller who markets a product as his own.' If the seller who markets
a product as his own is not liable as a manufacturer, with the exception of when
the seller plays a role in design or preparing warnings, the new Act represents a
departure from the prior law as established by Reeves. Under the Act, the seller is
entitled to recover indemnity from the manufacturer for costs of litigation when
the seller is found liable for a defective product unless "the seller exercised sub-
stantial control over that aspect of the design, testing, manufacture, packaging or
labeling of the product that caused the harm."'74 Consistently with the Act, the
165. See infra text accompanying notes 247-64.
166. 486 So. 2d 374 (Miss. 1986).
167. Id. at 375.
168. Id. at 378. The court followed Swift & Co. v. Hawkins, 164 So. 231 (Miss. 1935) which held that one
who markets a chattel as his own is treated as the manufacturer when the product causes injury through a
defect, even if the product is manufactured by another. Swift at 232.
169. 258 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1972).
170. Id. at 245 (Miss. 1972). The Shainberg court refused to extend the rule of strict products liability to
wholesalers and retailers. Id. at 244. See infra text accompanying notes 237-67, regarding the liability of
retailers and wholesalers for products liability claims.
171. Section 402A, supra note 5, cmt. f.
172. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 400 (1965) (treating sellers as manufacturers when the
product is marketed as the seller's own product) with the MODEL ACT, supra note 53, § 102(B) (treating a seller
as a manufacturer "only to the extent that it designs, produces, makes, fabricates, constructs, or remanufactures
the product before its sale").
173. MIss. CODE ANN. § 1 -1-63(g)(i) (Supp. 1995).
174. Id.
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court should treat the seller as a manufacturer to the extent that the seller exer-
cised control over that aspect of design, warning, or marketing which caused the
injury. However, merely marketing a product as the seller's own does not provide
a sufficient basis to treat the seller as a manufacturer with respect to any differ-
ence in duties owed by a seller to the consumer or user.
1 5
With reference to component part manufacturers, the Act does not require a
different result from the law prior to the Act. The general rule in the United
States is that component part manufacturers are liable for defects in their prod-
ucts. " 6 Mississippi has followed this approach as well. As shown by Detroit
Marine Engineering v. McRee,"7 component part manufacturers are liable in
Mississippi to the injured party for defects in component parts supplied to the
final assembler. In Detroit Marine, the court affirmed a judgment against the
manufacturer-supplier of a defective steering mechanism installed in a boat by
the manufacturer of the boat.178 The parties did not raise any issue as to the com-
ponent part manufacturer's liability as a manufacturer. " 9 Treating a component
part manufacturer as liable for injuries caused by defects in the component part
is proper and consistent with the policies underlying both the Act and Section
402A.
180
C. The Status of Design Professionals
In dealing with other defendants in a product liability claim, the court may face
a problem in resolving the liability exposure of a manufacturer's employees, such
as engineers who design products. 8 ' An interesting problem could arise in this
connection: Assume that a manufacturer distributes a product that presents a
danger that cannot be designed out of the product without substantially impairing
the product's usefulness. Under this scenario, a manufacturer is not liable if the
175. As will be discussed in PART II of this Article, the language of the statute suggests that there may be a
difference between the manufacturer and the nonmanufacturer seller with respect to liability for design and
warning.
176. IA FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 50, §5.06. However, if the component part is altered or substantial-
ly modified before reaching the user or consumer, the component part manufacturer is not liable. See
TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 55, § 4 reporter's note cmt. b.
177. 510 So. 2d462 (Miss. 1987).
178. Id. at471.
179. Although the validity of Hamilton Fixture Co. v. Anderson, 285 So. 2d 744 (Miss. 1973) is in doubt as to
strict tort liability for fixtures in a permanent structure, that case also illustrates that component part manufac-
turers are liable to consumers for defects in their components.
180. The liability of the component part manufacturer and the final assembler may be different depending on
the facts. For example, a component part manufacturer who makes a part according to the design specifications
supplied by the assembler of the final product may be liable only if the component part manufacturer knew or
should have known of the danger (and the other conditions pertaining to failure to function as expected and fea-
sible alternative design are met). Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(f)(i)-(ii) (Supp. 1995). It may be that the assem-
bler who supplied the specifications had greater knowledge and is thus liable if it knew or should have known
of the danger and there was a feasible alternative design. Similarly, with respect to warnings, the component
part manufacturer may be relieved of any duty to warn when it would be reasonable for a person in such a posi-
tion to not supply a warning independently, but rely on the assembler to provide proper warnings and instruc-
tions. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1 l-l-63(c)(ii) (Supp. 1995).
181. As to subcontractors who supply materials in connection with services, see supra text accompanying
notes 153-58.
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ordinary person in the community would recognize the danger of the design.182
However, as to the professional engineer who designed the product, a question
remains as to his liability if, under a general negligence standard, a reasonable
person would not design the particular product even in the absence of alternative
designs because the risk of harm is too great. The term "manufacturer" does not
in the normal use of the word include professional engineers or other product
designers employed by the manufacturer. Thus, theoretically, the court could
apply a general negligence standard to the engineer and find liability, though the
Act would prohibit such a finding against the employer-manufacturer.
183
On the other hand, the court could apply by analogy 84 the provision that pro-
tects manufacturers against liability for products that cannot be made safer, but
there is no requirement that it do so. Such an approach would be consistent with
the underlying policy adopted by the legislature to bar liability for products for
which there is no alternative design available that would leave the product's utili-
ty intact. Thus, the manufacturer's design employees should not be liable in neg-
ligence for defects in products when the employer-manufacturer cannot be held
liable independently.
D. Who is a Seller?
1. Commercial Sellers
In using both the terms "manufacturer" and "seller," the legislature presumably
intended to give distinct meanings to each word. Certainly the term "seller"
includes those in the chain of distribution such as nonmanufacturer wholesalers
and retailers, 181 while the term "manufacturer" includes those involved in the
design and manufacture of the product itself. At least in part, the purpose of the
distinction lies in the provisions of the statute by which sellers may obtain
indemnity from manufacturers,188 creating a need to distinguish them. As will be
discussed in Part II of this Article, the ambiguity of the language of the statute
suggests that other distinctions may also exist.' 87
As with the term "manufacturer," the Act does not define the term "seller."
Nothing in the Act, however, suggests that the legislature intended the Act to
182. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(b) (Supp. 1995). The Act provides that
"[a] product is not defective in design or formulation if the harm for which the claimant seeks to
recover compensatory damages was caused by an inherent characteristic of the product which is a
generic aspect of the product that cannot be eliminated without substantially compromising the
product's usefulness or desirability and which is recognized by the ordinary person with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community."
Id.
183. Design professionals such as engineers and architects are not generally subject to strict liability rules
because they provide a service. However, they are subject to the laws of negligence. IA FRUMER & FRIEDMAN,
supra note 50, § 5.13.
184. Cf J. L. Teel Co. v. Houston United Sales, Inc., 491 So. 2d 851 (Miss. 1986) (applying warranty provi-
sions of the Uniform Commercial Code by analogy to commercial lessors).
185. Whether the term "sellers" in the Act included others in the chain of distributions such as commercial
lessors or bailors remains to be determined. See infra text accompanying notes 225-27.
186. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(g)(i) (Supp. 1995).
187. For example, the Act undoubtedly makes the seller strictly liable for deviation defects, but it contains
ambiguity on the issue of liability for warning or design defects, suggesting that the seller is liable for such
defects only if negligent. Compare MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(i) with (c)(i), (d) (Supp. 1995).
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alter the scope of the traditional application of products liability rules in order to
reach beyond commercial sellers to include occasional sellers. The difference
between Section 402A and the Act is that the Act distinguishes between manu-
facturers and nonmanufacturer sellers.'88 Section 402A 89 and the American Law
Institute's Tentative Draft,19 limit the meaning of "seller" to commercial sell-
ers-those in the business of selling. As set forth in the comments to Section
402A, manufacturers, retailers, wholesalers, restaurant operators, and others in
the chain of distribution of a product should be considered sellers under Section
402A because they are in the business of selling.19 Mississippi has previously
followed the approach of restricting strict products liability to those in the busi-
ness of manufacturing or selling the products involved in the claims, as reflected
in the case of Alley v. Praschak Machine Co..192
In Alley, the court refused to extend products liability rules to persons who
engage in only isolated sales and who are not in the business of selling the prod-
uct involved. 93 The seller in that case was only in the business of assembling the
type of industrial machinery involved in the plaintiff's injury, not in purchasing
and reselling such machinery, and sold the product only as an accommodation to
the purchaser.'94 According to the court, one who made an isolated sale of a
product solely to aid the purchaser's bookkeeping was not a seller for purposes of
strict products liability.'95 Thus, the court recognized the principle that, under
Section 402A as applied in Mississippi, occasional sellers are outside the cover-
age of the section. The court, however, has not yet developed a clear boundary
between the occasional seller and one in the business of selling.' 96
The Alley court relied on the earlier case of Pridgett v. Jackson Iron & Metal
Co.."' In Pridgett, one of the defendants manufactured garden tools and
acquired paint in fifty-five gallon drums for use in painting the tools.' 98 The
company stored the empty paint drums outside until it had accumulated 25 to
100 drums and then sold the drums to a scrap metal dealer, the other defen-
dant.' 99 The scrap metal dealer in turn sold the drums primarily to steel mills for
reprocessing and made occasional sales of drums to customers for use as indus-
trial trash cans. 0 An employee of a company that purchased drums for use as
trash cans was injured when one of the drums he was attempting to cut into two
188. See supra note 187, regarding the effects of the distinction between manufacturers and sellers.
189. Section 402A, supra note 5, cmt. f.
190. TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 55, § I cmt. c.
191. Section 402A, supra note 5, cmt. f.
192. 366 So. 2d 661 (Miss. 1979).
193. Id. at 666.
194. Id. at 664, 666.
195. Id. at 666.
196. The occasional seller who sells outside the normal course of business, such as an occasional sale of sur-
plus equipment by a business, is not subject to the rules governing products liability claims. Section 402A,
supra note 5, cmt. f; TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 55, § I cmt. c. The determination of whether a seller is a
commercial seller under the rule is generally a question of law for the court. TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 55,
§ 1 cmt. c.
197. Pridget v. Jackson Iron & Metal Co., 253 So. 2d 837 (Miss. 1971).
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sections with an acetylene torch exploded.2"' In affirming the trial court's direct-
ed verdict for the defendants, the supreme court held that the garden tool manu-
facturer was not a "manufacturer" for purposes of strict products liability." 2 The
fact that the garden tool manufacturer's principal business was making tools per-
suaded the court that it should not treat the company as a manufacturer in rela-
tion to the disposition of empty paint drums to a scrap metal dealer.2"3
While courts generally treat the matter of whether a defendant is in the busi-
ness of selling as an issue of law,204 nevertheless, they must resolve the issue on a
case-by-case basis. Pridgett presents an interesting illustration of when product
sales that are incidental to the seller's business are deemed to be within the cov-
erage of Section 402A or the Act. In Pridgett, the tool manufacturer's sales of
used drums were incidental to its business and, while apparently infrequent, were
periodic and routine. 25  The court found that the incidental nature of the sales
was insufficient to make the tool manufacturer a "manufacturer" (seller) for the
purposes of Section 402A.2°8 In contrast, the scrap dealer was in the business of
selling scrap to steel mills for reprocessing, but made occasional sales of drums
for industrial trash cans to others.2 7 Apparently, the court considered such sales
as subject to Section 402A, at least for warning purposes °.2 8  The key for the
court lay in the nature of the seller's primary business.2 s However, the lines are
not sharp between incidental sales that are covered, because the seller is in the
business of selling, and those which are not.
2. Sellers of Used Products
The Mississippi Supreme Court has never directly addressed whether sellers of
used products are subject to strict liability under 402A. The court has dealt with
201. Id.
202. Id. at 840.
203. Id. There is no question that the defendant tool maker did not manufacture the drums. However, the
court actually seemed to be trying to decide whether the defendant could be classified as a commercial seller of
drums for purposes of Section 402A. Because the tool maker did more than simply pass the product on without
inspection, arguably Sam Shainberg Co. v. Barlow, 258 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1972) (refusing to apply strict liabili-
ty to retailers and wholesalers who are merely sales conduits) would not apply. Likewise, the court apparently
treated the scrap dealer as subject to Section 402A, though it clearly did not manufacture the drums either.
Pridget v. Jackson Iron and Metal Co., 253 So. 2d 837, 839 (Miss. 1991). The plaintiff's theory was that the
scrap dealer knew or should have known of the danger of cutting into the drums with an acetylene torch, but
failed to warn under Section 402A. Id. at 843. The scrap dealer was requested to provide drums that "looked
good," were not rusty and had "both ends in them." Id. at 842. Thus, because the seller was required to inspect
and select the drums to be sold to the buyer, the seller acted as more than a mere conduit. As with the tool
maker, Shainberg would appear to be inapplicable. In any event, the court need not have gone so far in its deci-
sion with respect to the strict liability of sellers based on the occasional nature of the sales. The court found
other bases for nonliability which were better grounded. In particular the court found that the product "was not
being used for the purpose for which it was manufactured or in the manner in which the manufacturer intended
for it to be used." Id. Thus, the sellers were not liable under strict products liability. The evidence demonstrat-
ed that the product was not defective and that no warning was necessary because the employer of the plaintiff
was aware of the danger and had instructed his employee as to the proper method of cutting the drum in two,
which, if followed, would have avoided the injury. Id. The court also noted that its research failed to disclose
cases in other jurisdictions which held that sellers of used products were subject to strict products liability. Id.
at 840-41. See infra text accompanying notes 210-223.
204. TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 55, § 1 cmt. c.
205. Pridgett, 253 So. 2d at 840.
206. Id. at 840.
207. Id.
208. See id. at 841-42.
209. Id.
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only one case, Pridgett v. Jackson Iron & Metal Co.,21 involving the sale of
allegedly defective used products. 1 However, the court decided the issue in
favor of one of the defendant sellers because it was only an occasional seller of
the products involved.1 2 As to the other defendant, the plaintiff failed to prove
the product was unreasonably dangerous for its intended use.2"3
The court did point out that its research did not reveal any cases holding that
sellers of used products were strictly liable for injuries caused by product defects,
except under the doctrines of implied or express warranty. 14 Although the court
did not hold that used product sellers may not be held strictly liable in products
liability, its reference to a lack of authority for such a position serves as a strong
indication that used product sellers, at least passive ones,21 ' are likely to escape
the application of strict products liability.21 6 In taking such a position,
Mississippi would follow the approach generally taken in other jurisdictions. 7
However, with respect to used product sellers who repair, recondition, or modi-
fy the product that they sell, the result may be different. 18 As noted by one
court, "[w]hen . . .the product has undergone extensive repair, inspection and
testing at the hands of the seller prior to resale, the policy considerations behind
our adoption of strict liability favor its application."219 Courts are likely to treat a
seller who reconditions used products as a manufacturer for purposes of products
liability law.22°
The legislature gave no hint in the new Act as to how the courts should apply
its provisions to sellers of used products. The language of the Act, on its face,
does not bar application of the Act to used product sellers. However, given the
apparent intent of the legislature to restrict the scope of strict products liability,22 1
and the generally accepted view that strict products liability is not applicable to
used products sellers, it is unlikely that the legislature intended to include passive
sellers of used products within the scope of the Act.
210. Id. at 840.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 841.
214. Id. at 840-41. Courts have generally not applied strict products liability rules to used product sellers
because such sellers are not in the normal chain of direct distribution and are generally far removed from any
communication with the manufacturer of the product. Moreover, the buyer's expectations of the product are
generally less than for new products, and the courts desire to keep strict liability within reasonable bounds. I
MADDEN, supra note 25, §§ 3.26, 6.20.
215. The defendants in Pridgett apparently did not make any repairs to or modifications in the product
involved. Pridgett v. Jackson Iron & Metal Co., 253 So. 2d 837, 840, 842 (Miss. 1971).
216. Other commentators take the view that Pridgett did hold that used product sellers are not strictly liable,
giving a somewhat broader reading to the court's comments citing cases from other jurisdictions holding that
used product sellers are not subject to strict liability. See Frank L. Maraist & Rhesa H. Barksdale, Mississippi
Products Liability--A Critical Analysis, 43 Miss. L.J. 139, 151 (1972).
217. IA FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 50, § 5.07(5) ("Generally, the merely passive dealer in used goods
will not be potentially liable in strict liability because to hold otherwise would require a complete and radical
alteration of the nature of the market for used products." (footnote omitted)).
218. IA FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 50, § 5.07(5).
219. Kodiak Elec. Ass'n v. DeLaval Turbine, Inc., 694 P.2d 150, 154 n.6 (Alaska 1984).
220. See Gentile v. MacGregor Mfg. Co., 493 A.2d 647 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1985).
221. As PART II of this Article will demonstrate, the legislature has moved products liability law away from
strict liability in the areas of warnings and design and toward a theory which reflects a fault-based approach.
See Miss. CODE ANN. § I I-1-63(c)(i), (f)(i) (Supp. 1995). But see Harges, supra note 2, at 712.
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An anamoly will occur, however, if passive used product sellers are outside the
coverage of the Act. Actions based on expressed or implied warranties would
remain available to used products purchasers against sellers for damages caused
by a defective product. In contrast, such actions will not be available to new
product purchasers, other than for damage to the product itself.222 With respect
to used product sellers who repair or modify used products, if such sellers are
treated as manufacturers under the Act, implied warranty will not be available to
recover damages caused by such repaired or modified defective products.
General negligence theory may also provide a basis of liability for passive sell-
ers of used products, such as when an automobile dealer fails to reasonably
inspect a used automobile.22 Such a theory is no longer available against new
product sellers in a claim for damages caused by a defective product. The Act
does not appear to permit theories other than those set forth in the statute.
3. Commercial Lessors and Bailors
Less certain is the intent of the legislature with regard to others in the business
of supplying products to the marketplace, but who are not strictly entering into
contracts of sale. The Act does not expressly address the status of commercial
lessors and bailors in the context of products liability claims. The court may face
the issue of what rules to apply to commercial lessors, bailors, or others in the
commercial chain of product distribution. If the term "seller" as used by the Act
does not include lessors and bailors, the court must develop common law rules in
appropriate cases because the legislation does not preempt the field.224
The Mississippi Supreme Court has never dealt with the issue of products lia-
bility for commercial lessors and bailors, and Section 402A did not use the terms
"lessor" or "bailor" in its treatment of sellers. However, a majority of states have
interpreted the term "seller" as used in Section 402A to include lessors and
bailors.22 Other states expressly have included lessors and bailors in the defini-
tion of the term "seller" in products liability statutes.22 An express inclusion of
commercial product distributors would serve to avoid confusion as to the nature
of the liability of those in the chain of distibution of products. However, until the
legislature amends the Act, the courts must determine what rules should apply.
222. See infra text accompanying notes 275-80 and 318-23. The implied warranty of merchantability applies
to the sales of used goods in Mississippi. Beck Enterprises, Inc. v. Hester, 512 So. 2d 672, 676 (Miss. 1987).
223. E.g., Patton v. McHone, 822 S.W2d 608 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991).
224. See Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581 (Del. 1976).
225. IA FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 50, § 5.08[2]. Section 1 of the TENrATrvE DRAr includes within
the scope of responsibility for damages caused by defective products "[o]ne engaged in the business of selling
or otherwise distributing products." TENTATIVE DRAir, supra note 55, § 1(a). Commercial lessors, bailors, and
promoters are among those who otherwise distribute and come within the ambit of the rules of products liabili-
ty. Id. § 5(b).
226. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-102(7) (1980); TEX. CIV. PR.AC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.001(3) (Supp.
1995) (defining seller as "a person who is engaged in the business of distributing or otherwise placing, for any
commercial purpose, in the stream of commerce for use or consumption a product or any component part there-
of"). One question that arises in this context is whether lessors and bailors of used products should be treated
like sellers of used products rather than as new product sellers. The issue has not been adequately addressed by
the courts or commentators.
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If the court chooses to follow a narrow or literal interpretation of the term
"seller" in the Act, excluding nonseller commercial distributors from the Act's
coverage, one would expect the court to follow an approach to such distributors
in products liability claims similar to the approach that it has taken in claims
against lessors for breaches of implied warranties. In claims for breach of
implied warranties by lessors, the court has applied the sales articles of the
Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code227 by analogy to leases that are function-
ally equivalent to sales.228
In dealing with products liabilty claims against lessors and other nonseller dis-
tributors, the court could choose, for instance, to find that since commercial
lessors and bailors place products into the stream of commerce, the rules of lia-
bility for defects in such products ought to follow the same principles applicable
by statute to sellers.229 Although the Act does not expressly include nonseller
commercial distributors, the court should treat them as sellers by analogy for the
purposes of products liability. Thus, nonseller commercial distributors should be
liable on the same grounds as commercial sellers, even though not strictly cov-
ered by the Act. The same policies that the Act promotes as to sellers apply
equally to nonseller commercial distributors.2"' Such an approach would best
promote the policies that the legislature has chosen to implement in the field of
products liability law and would promote consistency and predictability in the
law of products liability.
On the other hand, if the court were to find that the legislature did not intend to
include lessors and bailors, the court would be free to continue to find liability
applying rules of implied warranty, as it did in Thompson v. Reilly.231 In
Thompson, a minor sustained injuries while she was using a defective washing
machine on the premises of the defendant's self-service laundry.232 The supreme
court, reversing a directed verdict for the defendant, found an implied warranty
of fitness for the machine's intended use and a prima facie case of liability
against the owner of the laundry.233 Thus, under the law prior to the Act, plain-
tiffs could bring claims for personal injury against commercial lessors under the
theory of implied warranty, much as plaintiffs could bring such claims against
sellers.234
If the court were to exclude commercial lessors and bailors from the Act's cov-
erage, whether by using a narrow interpretation of the term "seller" or by refus-
ing to apply the Act by analogy, implied warranty would survive as a cause of
action against such lessors and bailors much as an implied warranty apparently
227. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-101 to -725 (1972 & Supp. 1995).
228. J.L. Teel Co. v. Houston United Sales, Inc., 491 So. 2d 851 (Miss. 1986).
229. See IA FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 50, § 5.08.
230. For example, a consumer who leases an automobile is likely to have at least as much, if not more,
reliance on the lessor as he would have on the dealer with respect to the freedom of the product from latent
defects. See 1 MADDEN, supra note 25, § 3.25. Commercial lessors are in the chain of distribution and market-
ing, and thus, should be treated similarly to those who are actually selling. See 1 MADDEN, supra note 25, §
6.17.
231. 211 So. 2d 537, 540 (Miss. 1968).
232. Id. at 538.
233. Id. at 540.
234. Cf MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-314, 75-2-315 (1972).
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survives against sellers of used products.23 In contrast, under the language of
the Act, product sellers are no longer liable for damages for breach of implied
warranty, other than commercial damages to the product itself, because such a
breach is not one of the grounds for liability in a products liability case.236 All in
all, the use of analogy better serves the policies underlying the Act which the leg-
islature apparently is seeking to promote. Analogizing commercial leases and
bailments to sales promotes unity, consistency, and stability of the law of prod-
ucts liability.
E. The Liability of the Nonmanufacturer-Seller
When the Mississippi Supreme Court first adopted Section 402A in State
Stove Manufacturing Co. v. Hodges,237 it limited the application of strict liability
for defective products to manufacturers and sellers who install products. 38 In the
1972 case of Sam Shainberg Co. v. Barlow,239 the court refused to extend strict
liability to retailers and wholesalers who act as mere sales conduits.20  Instead,
the court held that retailers and wholesalers have no duty to inspect and discover
latent defects in merchandise purchased from reputable manufacturers and sold
in the original condition as received from the manufacturer.241
Despite the fact that Section 402A clearly stated a rule of strict liability for
commercial sellers, whether manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer,242 the court
considered such liability for nonmanufacturer-sellers to be unreasonable, illogi-
cal, and Impractical.i2 4 3 n particular, the court felt that to apply strict liability to
nonmanufacturer sellers of products with latent defects would unfairly make
such sellers the guarantors or insurers of many thousands of products for which
they were merely "sales conduits. ' 244  In 1975, shortly after Shainberg, came
Parker v. Ford Motor Co., 2 11 in which the court continued to apply the rule of
Shainberg, and barred strict liability claims for latent defects against nonmanu-
facturer-sellers.246
235. See supra text accompanying notes 222-23.
236. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(i) (Supp. 1995).
237. 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1966).
238. Id. at 118. See supra text accompanying notes 247-60 (In more recent years the court apparently has
broadened the application of Section 402A to sellers.).
239. 258 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1972) (a suit arising out of injuries caused by the defective heel of a shoe pur-
chased from a retailer).
240. Id. at 244-45.
241. Id.
242. Section 402A, supra note 5, cmt. f. Comment f states:
The rule stated in this Section applies to any person engaged in the business of selling products for
use or consumption. It therefore applies to any manufacturer of such a product, to any wholesale or
retail dealer or distributor, and to the operator of a restaurant.... The basis for the rule is the ancient
one of the special responsibility for the safety of the public undertaken by one who enters into the
business of supplying human beings with products which may endanger the safety of their persons
and property, and the forced reliance upon that undertaking on the part of those who purchase such
goods.
Id.
243. Shainberg, 258 So. 2d at 246.
244. Id.
245. 331 So. 2d 923 (Miss. 1976) (involving a latent defect in the steering mechanism of a truck purchased
by the plaintiff from the defendant retailer).
246. Id. at 925.
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The Mississippi Supreme Court did not revisit the issue of nonmanufacturer
liability again until 1986 in the case of Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Reeves.247 In
Reeves, the court held that "one who sells or distributes as his own a product
manufactured by another is subject to liability the same as though he were a
manufacturer." '248 In reaching this conclusion, the court discussed what had
become the "oft criticized decision" in Shainberg2 49 The court noted that it had
not considered the issue of nonmanufacturer-seller liability for nearly a
decade.2" Upon reexamination of Shainberg, Justice Robertson, writing for the
majority, concluded that the Shainberg decision was "anomalous, if not irra-
tional," noting that Section 402A imposed strict liability on anyone engaged in
the business of selling,251 that Shainberg relied on an embarrassing misreading of
a section of a leading treatise on products liability law,2"2 and was out of step
with the intent behind Section 402A.53
Despite the language virtually disowning Shainberg, the court distinguished
that case from Reeves and declined to overrule it.2 4 The court distinguished
Reeves from Shainberg because of the identification of the product in Reeves
with the seller and the consumer's reliance upon the seller whose insignia was on
the product.5 In contrast, in Shainberg, the court stated that there was an
assumption that the consumer relied only on the manufacturer for the safety of
shoes purchased from a retailer.25 " Thus, while casting great doubt on
Shainberg's vitality, the court did not explicitly overrule it. The precise issue has
not yet presented itself to the court since Reeves. Certainly the refusal to extend
strict liability to sellers under Section 402A was out of step with the intent of the
section and with the interpretation given by other American courts.
In the recent case of Scordino v. Hopeman Brothers, Inc.,25 7 the court faced an
issue of whether to treat a subcontractor who installed asbestos paneling in a ship
as a seller for purposes of strict liability.25 The court stated that "the applicabil-
ity of the strict liability doctrine depends upon, among other things, whether the
defendant is a manufacturer or seller in the business of selling a defective prod-
uct. 25 9 The court clearly considered sellers to be strictly liable in Mississippi
under Section 402A, apparently without the qualifications of the Shainberg
Doctrine. However, the case is distinguishable from Shainberg because the
247. 486 So. 2d 374 (Miss. 1986).
248. Id. at 378 (citing Swift & Co. v. Hawkins, 164 So. 231, 232 (Miss. 1935); and Lovelace v. Astra Trading
Corp., 439 F. Supp. 753, 757 (S.D. Miss. 1977)).
249. Reeves, 486 So. 2d at 378.
250. Id. at 379 n.3.
251. Id. at 379. According to the Reeves court, the Shainberg decision was not in keeping with the era of
strict liability imposed on those in the chain of product distribution and that it was not necessary to extend pro-
tection from strict liability to retailers because of the availability of indemnity. Id. at 379 n.4.
252. Id. at n.5. The treatise was Louis R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTs LIABILITY § 18.01
(1970).
253. Reeves, 486 So. 2d at 379 n.4.
254. Id. at 379.
255. Id. at 379-80.
256. Id. at 380.
257. 662 So. 2d 640 (Miss. 1995).
258. Id. at641-42.
259. Id. at 643.
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defendant, even if it had been found to be a seller, was a subcontractor involved
in the installation of the product as opposed to merely being a sales conduit.260
Thus, while it is likely that the Shainberg Doctrine is no longer valid because of
the pronouncements of Reeves and Scordino, the Mississippi Supreme Court still
has not yet explicitly sounded the doctrine's death knell.
The federal district courts sitting in Mississippi, however, have decided three
cases involving the nature of liability by nonmanufacturer-sellers since the
Reeves decision.261 In all three cases the court held that Reeves, while not explic-
itly overruling Shainberg, nevertheless destroyed its precedential value.262 In the
view of the federal district courts, the Mississippi Supreme Court in Reeves fully
adopted Section 402A,263 so that under the common law of Mississippi, retailers
and wholesalers are strictly liable for injuries caused by defective products. This
writer agrees that Shainberg no longer represents the law of Mississippi as it
stood prior to the enactment of the new statute.264
Having concluded that Mississippi law after the Reeves decision imposed strict
liability on wholesalers and retailers for defective products, including those with
manufacturing or deviation defects, one must then determine what the law is
under the new statute. Under the new Act, the seller is strictly liable for devia-
tion defects created by the manufacturer, as well as for defects that occur in the
product while in the chain of distribution under the seller's control or the control
of a predecessor in the chain.26 While this does not apparently represent a
departure from the law, prior to the effective date of the new statute, at least a
interpreted by the federal courts, it does clarify the liability of nonmanufacturer-
sellers as to deviation defects. Such a result is consistent with the current draft
version of the new Restatement.266 Part II of this Article will address the liability
of the nonmanufacturer-seller as to design and warning defects which is less
clear than the liability for deviation defects.267
260. Id. at 642.
261. Butler v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 815 F. Supp. 982 (S.D. Miss. 1993); Curry v. Sile Distributors, 727
F. Supp. 1052 (N.D. Miss. 1990); and Bounds v. Joslyn Mfg. & Supply Co., 660 E Supp. 1063 (S.D. Miss.
1986).
262. Butler, 815 F. Supp. at 985; Curry, 727 E Supp. at 1054; and Bounds, 660 F. Supp. at 1066 n.5.
263. See, e.g., Butler, 815 E Supp. at 985.
264. See Harges; supra note 2, at 768.
265. MIss. CODE ANN. § 1 -1-63(a) (Supp. 1995) provides that
[t]he manufacturer or seller of the product shall not be liable if the claimant does not prove by the
preponderance of the evidence that at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer or
seller.... [t]he product was defective because it deviated in a material way from the manufacturer's
specifications or from otherwise identical units manufactured to the same manufacturing specifica-
tions.
(emphasis added). Moreover, the legislature apparently intended this to be the case since it provided for an
expanded right of indemnity from the manufacturers, recognizing that the seller may be held liable for defective
products. The right of indemnity will be discussed in PART II of this Article.
266. TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 55, §1. In contrast, the MODEL AcT, supra note 53, § 105, provides for
nonmanufacturer-seller liability only in the event the plaintiff proves negligence by the seller, or breach of
express warranty by the seller, or the manufacturer is essentially judgment proof
267. The portions of the Act setting forth the proof requirements for warning defects or design defects appear
to require proof that the seller knew or should have known of the danger created by the defect in order for the
plaintiff to recover from the seller. See Miss. CODE ANN.J. § 11-1-63(c)(i), (f)(i) (Supp. 1995).
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F Claimants and Interests Protected by the Act
1. Overview of the Interests Covered by the Act and Prior Common Law
After the adoption of Section 402A in Mississippi, and prior to the effective
date of the Act, a plaintiff could bring an action in Mississippi for physical dam-
age to person or property caused by a defective product under the theory of strict
products liability,268 negligence,269 or breach of warranty.2  As to the latter theo-
ry, the supreme court, in Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Reeves,271 criticized the ten-
dency to bring product liability claims via warranty actions as creating "unneces-
sary legal complications. 272 Despite this criticism, plaintiffs have continued to
bring actions for damages to person or property caused by unreasonably danger-
ous defective products under a warranty theory.273  Plaintiffs could also bring
claims under the prior law for pure economic loss caused by defective products
under a breach of warranty theory.
274
The new Act appears to have made dramatic, and even drastic, changes in the
law of products liability with regard to the kinds of protected interests of the
injured party, called "the claimant, ' 27 ' and the theories available to assert those
interests. The language of the Act is inclusive, addressing "any action for dam-
ages caused by a product except for commercial damage to the product itself."
276
The Act remains otherwise silent as to the specific kinds of injury or harm that
the legislature intended to cover, except that the Act specifically excludes com-
mercial damage to the product itself.2" Presumably, then, the Act provides the
exclusive theories for asserting claims for personal injury, death, property dam-
268. See, e.g., State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1966).
269. See Hamilton Fixture Co. v. Anderson, 285 So. 2d 744 (Miss. 1973) (recognizing that the adoption of
strict products liability did not exclude claims alternatively based on negligence).
270. See, e.g., R. Clinton Constr. Co. v. Bryant & Reaves, Inc., 442 E Supp. 838 (N.D. Miss. 1977) (involving
a claim for consequential damages caused by defective antifreeze and based on breach of express warranty);
Wilmoth v. Peaster Tractor Co., 544 So. 2d 1384 (Miss. 1989) (involving a claim of breach of implied warranty
based on allegations of a defective brake or park lock of a tractor).
271. 486 So. 2d 374 (Miss. 1986).
272. Id. at 384.
273. See, e.g., Toney v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 975 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Mississippi law
to a claim against a motorcycle manufacturer); Lloyd v. John Deere Co., 922 E2d 1192 (5th Cir, 1992) (apply-
ing Mississippi law to a claim against a tractor manufacturer); and Wilmoth v. Peaster Tractor Co., 544 So. 2d
1384 (Miss. 1989) (involving a claim for injury from an allegedly defective tractor). Jeffrey Wittenberg sug-
gests that plaintiffs have continued to use warranty theory as a products liability vehicle because the elimina-
tion of privity, the prohibition of disclaimers of implied warranty, and the limitations on disclaimers of liability
in the Mississippi version of the Uniform Commercial Code continue to make the theory attractive.
WITrENBERG, supra note 32, § 3-2. Moreover, warranty theory supplied an available theory for the application
of strict liability to sellers. WITTrENBERG, supra note 32, § 3-6.
274. See WITTENBERG, supra note 32, § 3-4 (citing generally Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-106, 75-2-711, 75-2-
715 (1972)). See also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 35, § 95A at 680 ("The Uniform Commercial Code is
generally regarded as the exclusive source for ascertaining when a seller is subject to liability for damages if the
claim is based on intangible economic loss not attributable to physical injury to person or harm to a tangible
thing other than the defective product itself.").
275. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a) (Supp. 1995).
276. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (Supp. 1995).
277. Id. The Act does not define "commercial damage to the product itself," but presumably the language
means that damages caused by the product that adversely affect the product's monetary value are not within the
scope of the Act's coverage. Id. Thus, the product owner would have to seek a remedy in the law of warranty
or contract.
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age, and economic loss caused by a defective product, except where the damage
involved is commercial damage to the product itself.278
The descriptive title of the enacted bill does not specifically mention actions
for property damage or economic loss, though it does specifically refer to actions
for personal injury and death.279 This omission from the descriptive title enacted
raises a question as to the intended scope of the Act's coverage with respect to
the interests protected. However, in light of the absence of any language in the
Act itself restricting the kinds of interests subject to the Act, coverage appears to
be broad, rather than narrow. Thus, the Act appears to govern all claims for dam-
ages to person or property, except for commercial damage to the product itself,
caused by defective products.
The impact of the Act on the law of implied and express warranty is particular-
ly striking. None of the categories or theories for asserting a claim for damages
caused by a defective product include implied warranty. Thus, the Act apparently
abolishes implied warranty as a theory of recovery for damages caused by a
defective product, even if the loss is purely economic."' The Act classifies
breach of express warranty as a defect, but a claimant may recover only if the
breach resulted in an unreasonably dangerous condition to the user or consumer
and the claimant justifiably relied on the warranty.28'
2. Personal Injury to Consumers and Users
The language of the Act leaves no doubt that one who actually uses or con-
sumes a product may bring a suit for deviation defect, design defect, warning
defect, or breach of express warranty for personal injury or wrongful death.282
The Act specifically requires that the claimant prove that the product was "unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer." '283 This language is similar to that of
Section 402A in its requirement that the defective condition be unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer.284 However, in a claim for breach of an
express warranty the claimants must also prove justifiable reliance on the war-
ranty in electing to use the product.
2 85
278. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(i) (Supp. 1995). In creating the categories of defect, the Act provides:
(a) The manufacturer or seller of the product shall not be liable if the claimant does not prove by the
preponderance of the evidence that at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer or
seller:
(i) 1. The product was defective because it deviated in a material way from the manufacturer's speci-
fications or from otherwise identical units manufactured to the same manufacturing specifications,
or
2. The product was defective because it failed to contain adequate warnings or instructions, or
3. The product was designed in a defective manner, or
4. The product breached an express warranty or failed to conform to other express factual represen-
tations upon which the claimant justifiably relied in electing to use the product ....
Id.
279. Act of Feb. 18, 1993, H.B. 1270, 1993 Miss. Laws ch. 302 (stating that the purpose of the Act is, among
other things, "to provide that the manufacturer or seller shall not be liable in an action for damages for personal
injury or death if the claimant does not prove certain facts about the product.").
280. But see Harges, supra note 2, at 729, 732.
281. Id. The justifiable reliance requirement is an apparent departure from prior law. See U.C.C. § 2-313,
official cmt. 3; and WITTENBERG, supra note 32, § 3-3.
282. WITrENBERG, supra note 32, § 3-3.
283. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1 1-1-63(a)(ii) (Supp. 1995).
284. Section 402A, supra note 5.
285. MIss. CODE ANN. § I I-1-63(a)(i)(4) (Supp. 1995).
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3. Personal Injury to Bystanders
With respect to negligence in general, liability extends to any foreseeable
plaintiff.286 The Mississippi Supreme Court has adopted a similar approach with
respect to strict liability claims. As shown by Coca Cola Bottling Co. v.
Reeves,287 under the law of Mississippi prior to the effective date of the Act, a
nonuser bystander injured by a defective product could make a products liability
claim for injuries. In Reeves, the court held that "the duty imposed by
Restatement § 402A to the extent that same has been incorporated into the posi-
tive law of this state exists in favor of anyone who may reasonably be expected to
be in the vicinity of the product's probable use and to be endangered by it if it is
defective." '288 Thus, strict products liability under the law prior to the Act applies
in cases involving foreseeable bystanders as well as consumers and users.289 The
court supported its adoption of this rule with the observation that "[t]he justness
of allowing bystanders to recover on a strict products liability theory is demon-
strably greater than is the case with almost any other potential plaintiff, for the
bystander is less able to avoid the accident than almost any other."2 ' The court
reaffirmed the position in Hall v. Mississippi Chemical Express, Inc.,291 and
Swan v. I.P, Inc..292
Like Section 402A, the new Act does not mention the status of bystanders as
claimants in products liability actions. The Act's wording does not require that
the claimant in a products liability action be a user or consumer of the product
causing injury in order to recover. The Act refers to "claimant" without designat-
ing the status of the claimant. Nevertheless, under the literal language of the
Act, the bystander must prove that the product was unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer as a prerequisite to recovery.293
The Act is silent as to whether the bystander must be foreseeable or not.
However, since the overall purpose of the Act appears to be to limit or restrict the
286. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 35, § 100, at 703. The case of Rose v. Mercury Marine, 483 So. 2d 1351
(Miss. 1986), represents an example of this rule in Mississippi. In Rose, the plaintiff was struck while he was
swimming by a boat. Id. at 1351. He alleged that the boat manufacturer negligently designed the boat and was
responsible for injuries when the propeller of the boat cut him. Id. at 1352. The court allowed the claim to go
forward, without discussion of the bystander status of the plaintiff. Id.
287. 486 So. 2d 374 (Miss. 1986) (a soft drink bottle shattered when it fell from a defective cardboard carton
injuring a bystander).
288. Id. at 378.
289. This rule is generally followed in other jurisdictions. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 35, § 100 at, 704.
290. Reeves, 486 So. 2d at 378 n.2.
291. 528 So. 2d 796 (Miss. 1988) (involving an unsuccessful claim by an injured oil refinery worker against a
truck manufacturer in connection with the accidental ignition of escaped hydrocarbons at the refinery).
292. 613 So. 2d 846 (Miss. 1993) (involving injuries to a school teacher from fumes given off by products
used in reroofing the school where the teacher worked). The federal courts applying Mississippi law have also
have allowed bystanders to bring strict products liability claims. See Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 978 E2d
1386 (5th Cir. 1992) (involving a personal injury claim that was unsuccessful because of open and obvious dan-
ger when a forklift backed into a bystander); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.
1984) (former shipyard worker sought damages against asbestos manufacturers and sellers for injuries received
from exposure to asbestos products used in shipbuilding); Lovelace v. Astra Trading Corp., 439 E Supp. 753
(S.D. Miss. 1977) (involving a claim for fire damage to the plaintiff's home caused by an allegedly defective
hair dryer purchased by his wife and used by his son).
293. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (a)(ii) (Supp. 1995) ("The defective condition rendered the product unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer."). See infra text accompanying notes 362-67, regarding whether a
product is unreasonably dangerous if the danger involved is to a bystander rather than the user or consumer.
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exposure of sellers and manufacturers to liability claims, the legislature is unlike-
ly to have intended to extend the liability for injuries to unforeseeable
bystanders. The Act does not seem to require such an extension. To the extent
that the Act leaves gaps in its coverage, the courts should continue to apply the
common law rule limiting liability to cases involving foreseeable persons.
4. Property and Economic Interests Protected by the Act
The language of the Act creates serious questions as to the basis of claims for
property damage and pure economic losses294 arising out of the use or consump-
tion of a defective product. The Act does not explicitly limit its application to
personal injury or death claims. Rather, the Act simply refers to "any action for
damages caused by a product."29 Thus, the Act's inclusive coverage apparently
extends to claims involving property damage or pure economic loss as well as
personal injury and wrongful death.296 The exclusion of coverage for claims aris-
ing from commercial damage to the defective product itself also indicates that
the legislature likely intended to include claims for property damage within the
Act.
297
If the legislature intended that the Act only pertain to physical injury to a con-
sumer or user, the exclusion of claims for damage to the product itself, without
also excluding other property damage claims, would be unnecessary. The exclu-
sion of claims for damage caused by a defective product to itself is consistent
with the rule in several jurisdictions. A number of courts treat damage to the
product itself as an economic loss for which recovery is not available in tort.298
However, the legislature created unnecessary confusion because the descriptive
title of the bill expressed an intent to cover only personal injury and death claims
and the Act itself omits any reference to unreasonable danger to property.
Although the interests covered by the Act appear to be broad, nevertheless, the
Act does not provide a remedy for every harm caused by a defective product.
The Act appears to limit claims to those involving products that pose unreason-
able danger only to a user or consumer, as opposed to danger only to property.299
In contrast, Section 402A specifically included claims for products that are
unreasonably dangerous to property."' If the Act's coverage, as suggested by the
294. Pure economic losses are losses which are not associated with physical injury to the person or harm to
tangible property other than the product itself. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 35, § 95A, at 680.
295. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (Supp. 1995).
296. In the absence of a clear intention by the legislature to remove property damage as an item of recovery
in a products liability action, Mississippi courts should allow plaintiffs to seek such damages in actions brought
under the Act. Interpreting the Act as excluding liability for property damage other than to the product itself
would be a major and unwarranted departure from the common law of products liability in Mississippi and
would seriously impair the recognition of and protection historically given by the law to the property interests
of Mississippi residents and businesses. Moreover, as shown in this discussion, the Act's language does not
support such an approach.
297. Id.
298. 4A AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCT LIABILrrv 3D § 60.51 (Timothy E. Travers et al, eds., 1991); see also
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 35, § 101.
299. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(ii) (Supp. 1995). See infra text accompanying notes 368-372.
300. Section 402A, supra note 5 (providing that "[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to ultimate user or consumer, or to his property"); TENTATtVE DRAFT, supra note 55, §§ 1(a), 6 (likewise
explicitly providing for property damage claims). Mississippi's approach, if it excludes such property damage
claims, is apparently unique.
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descriptive title of the bill,3"' and arguably by the restriction of unreasonably dan-
gerous to include only danger to the user or consumer,0 2 extends to cover only
personal injury or death claims, a question as to the appropriate basis for claims
for property damage and pure economic loss remains.
The Act's apparent coverage of property damage is in line with the prior law.
Traditionally, under a negligence theory or strict products liability theory as rep-
resented by Section 402A, a plaintiff may seek recovery for property damage,
other than damage to the product itself,03 caused by a product that was unreason-
ably dangerous to property. 4 Mississippi has followed the traditional approach
in its application of Section 402A in allowing claims for damage to property in a
products liability claim. 5 The very first case in which the supreme court adopt-
ed Section 402A involved a claim for property damage. 0 Of course, Section
402A explicitly included damage to property within its scope. 7
The Act's apparent coverage of claims for pure economic loss caused by a
product likely represents a significant departure from prior law. Courts have tra-
ditionally restricted claims for pure economic loss to breach of warranty or
breach of contract claims.3 8 However, a substantial minority of jurisdictions
have allowed negligence and strict liability claims for economic losses." 9
Although the Mississippi Supreme Court has not previously addressed the appli-
cation of a strict products liability theory to a claim for pure economic loss, it is
likely that the court will follow the traditional approach.
3 10
The problem presented by the Act is that, read literally, it severely limits the
claims of those who sustain property damage caused by defective products or
who suffer economic loss caused by a defective product. 1' The Act appears to
limit claims caused by defective products to only those claims involving unrea-
sonable danger to users or consumers, yet the Act purports to govern any claim
for damages caused by defective product, except for commercial damages to the
301. Act of Feb. 18, 1993, H.B. 1270, 1993 Miss. Laws ch. 302.
302. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(ii) (Supp. 1995).
303. Courts are divided over whether recovery for loss of the product itself should be allowed under products
liability theory. Some courts require such claims to be brought under contract theory subject to the provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code. 2 MADDEN, supra note 25, § 22.10.
304. Section 402A, supra note 5.
305. Hamilton Fixture Co. v. Anderson, 285 So. 2d 744 (Miss. 1973); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189
So. 2d 113 (Miss.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1966). See also William Cooper & Nephews, Inc. v. Pevey, 317
So. 2d 406 (Miss. 1975). In Pevey, the court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff awarding damages for loss of
cattle after being dipped in a cattle dip manufactured by the defendant. Id. at 409. The court, however,
reversed on the basis that the plaintiff failed to carry his burden of proof as to the existence of the defect. Id.
The right to recover for the loss of cattle as property was not at issue.
306. State Stove, 189 So. 2d 113 at 115.
307. Section 402A, supra note 5.
308. 2A FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 50, § 13.11; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 35, § 101 ("[E]ven
though marketing privity can justifiably be disregarded, the manifested intent of each seller would usually be
controlling as regards the scope of any guarantees related to the condition of the goods sold. Historically, there-
fore, the only tort action available to a disappointed purchaser suffering intangible commercial loss has been the
tort action of deceit for fraud and the only contract action has been for breach of warranty, express or
implied."). See also WITTENBERG, supra note 32, § 3-4. Cf MODEL ACT, supra note 53, § 103.
309. 2A FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 50, § 13.11.
310. Cf Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Evans, 406 So. 2d 15 (Miss. 1981) (affirming an award of consequential
damages to a purchaser of a defective new grain drill and used combine in a breach of warranty action).
311. Miss. CODEANN. § 11-1-63 (Supp. 1995).
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product itself. On its face, the Act provides no remedy for claimants whose
property is damaged by defective products that are unreasonably dangerous to
property only. Proof of danger to a consumer's, user's, or bystander's property
would not satisfy the literal requirements of the Act.3 12 For example, the rancher
who used a drug intended only for livestock would have no claim for the death of
his livestock caused by a deviation defect in the product because the defect did
not endanger human life or health. 13 The danger presented by the defective
product was to property, not to the user or consumer.
The lack of a remedy for damage to property traditionally available would
thwart the purpose of tort law, including the law of negligence, to compensate for
injuries caused by the fault of another. The elimination of a broad range of
claims for property damages would likewise remove the deterrence provided by
tort law to manufacturers against the marketing of unsafe products. The elimina-
tion of remedies for physical injury to property would likewise thwart the pur-
poses of imposing strict products liability 4 -- to spread the risk through pricing,
to provide incentives for manufacturers to develop safer products and for sellers
to deal with reputable manufacturers, and to avoid disappointment of reasonable
consumer expectations created by sellers and manufacturers.3 " The policies pro-
moted by negligence law and strict liability should apply whether a product is
unreasonably dangerous to humans or only their property. 1 To avoid serious
injustice to persons whose property is damaged by defective products, the legis-
lature should amend the Act to include within its scope products that are unrea-
sonably dangerous to property as well as persons.
Because the Act purports to govern any claim for damages, other than com-
mercial damages to the product itself, caused by a defective product,317 a literal
reading of the Act would also incorporate claims for pure economic loss. Such a
reading would relegate implied warranty claims for pure economic loss to
actions involving only real estate or used products and destroy much of the com-
mercial usefulness of warranty law in Mississippi. 8 Most claims for pure eco-
312. See infra text accompanying notes 362-67.
313. Cf William Cooper & Nephews, Inc. v. Pevey, 317 So. 2d 406 (Miss. 1975) (reversing the plaintiff's
award for death of his cattle because the evidence did not support a finding that the cattle dipping solution was
defective).
314. Traditional strict products liability survives only with respect to deviation defects under the Act. See
MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (Supp. 1995).
315. See TENrATIVE DRAFr, supra note 55, § 2 cmt. a.
316. See id. §§ 1-2. See also Section 402A(l), supra note 5.
317. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (Supp. 1995).
318. But see Harges, supra note 2, at 732.
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nomic losses caused by new products would not exist. 19 For example, suppose a
computer program contained on a compact disc does not function as intended or
warranted and causes a business purchaser's vital computer operations to shut
down resulting in economic losses including expenses to bring the operation
back on line and the loss of profits from lost sales. 2 A literal interpretation of
the Act would lead a court to conclude that the purchaser of the defective disc
has no breach of implied or express warranty action for consequential damages
because, although there was damage and a breach of warranty, express or
implied, the disc did not present an unreasonable danger to a consumer or user,
but only to the property of the user or consumer. 21 The Act's apparent preemp-
tion of other theories of recovery bars any other remedy.3 22 Ironically, plaintiffs
with claims arising from defective used products or defective component parts
incorporated into improvements to real property would retain a right to claim in
warranty, while purchasers of other new chattels would not. 23
Likewise, claims for property damage caused by breach of express warranty
will fail absent proof of reasonable reliance and unreasonable danger to a con-
sumer or user.3 24 Thus, express warranty may also become virtually meaningless
for all damages caused by chattels sold by commercial sellers or manufacturers,
except as to the product itself, or where the product causes personal injury or
death. Again, ironically, plaintiffs who have express warranty claims against fix-
ture manufacturers, used product sellers, or non-commercial sellers for property
damage caused by defective items will fare better than those whose property is
damaged by products sold by commercial sellers. Since fixtures are not products
under the current jurisprudential definition of product,32' and the term "sellers"
has not traditionally included those who make only occasional sales, 326 or used
319. Presumably only pure economic claims based on commercial loss to the product itself survive as warran-
ty claims under the new Act. See MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-1-63, 75-2-715 (Supp. 1995). As amended, Miss.
CODE ANN. § 75-2-715 provided with respect to claims for consequential damages from breach of warranty:
(2) Except as otherwise provided in House Bill No. 1270 [Laws, 1993, ch. 302], consequential dam-
ages resulting from the seller's breach include:
(a) Any loss resulting from general or particular requirements and needs of which the seller at the
time of contracting had reason to know and which could not reasonably be prevented by cover or
otherwise; and
(b) Injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of warranty."
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-715 (Supp. 1995).
Thus, taken together the two sections lead to the conclusion that claims may no longer be based on implied war-
ranty for any damages caused by a product other than to itself.
320. Cf Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Evans, 406 So. 2d 15 (Miss. 1981) (affirming an award of consequential
damages for crop loss to a purchaser of a defective new grain drill in a breach of warranty action).
321. As noted supra in the text accompanying notes 308-9, courts traditionally have considered claims for
pure economic loss, such as illustrated by the hypothetical, to be breach of warranty or contract claims, restrict-
ing products liability claims to those involving physical injury to person or property, other than the product
itself. Historically, the courts have excluded economic losses that are not a direct result of harm to the plain-
tiff's person or property from the coverage of tort law. TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 55, § 6 cmt. d, reporter's
note cmt. d.
322. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-715 (Supp. 1995) (incorporating the provisions of an Act Feb. 18, 1993,
H.B. 1270, 1993 Miss. Laws, ch. 302).
323. See supra text accompanying notes 214-15.
324. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(i)(4), (ii) (Supp. 1995).
325. See supra text accompanying notes 90-97.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 193-96.
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product sellers, 27 the Act does not affect express warranty claims against fixture
sellers or manufacturers and occasional sellers.
Even with the recognition that the Act allows for the recovery of property dam-
ages, a serious problem remains with respect to property damage caused by
defects in products that present an unreasonable danger to property only.328 The
problem of how to treat claims for economic losses also remains. The court
faces the prospect of adopting a literal interpretation that gives patently undesir-
able results not likely contemplated by the legislature, or of adopting an interpre-
tation that clearly ignores the actual language of the Act and the traditional
meanings ascribed to the terms used in the Act.
In a number of ways the Act represents a dramatic change in the law of
Mississippi, although the legislature did not likely intend to totally revolutionize
warranty law and tort law relating to property damage and pure economic loss
caused by defective products. However, to avoid such a revolution, the courts
must avoid a literal application of the Act by reading into the law restrictions on
the kinds of interests covered by the Act and expanding the scope of the Act with
respect to the availability of physical property damage. Thus, the court has three
alternative readings of the Act:
(1) A literal reading that would make the Act the exclusive basis upon which to
make any claim for damages other than to the product itself caused by a defec-
tive product; eliminating claims for pure economic loss and claims for damage
caused by products which are dangerous only to property;
(2) A reading which would limit the claims covered by the Act to personal
injury and death claims (consistent with the title of the bill), leaving the common
law of torts to govern property damage claims, and warranty law to govern pure
economic loss; 329 or
(3) A reading that would apply the Act in such a way as to include within the
reach of the Act claims for physical injury only (personal injury, death, and dam-
age to property, other than commercial damage to the product itself), but exclude
purely economic losses.3
327. See supra text accompanying notes 210-23.
328. See supra text accompanying notes 354-72.
329. This reading would presumably leave all property damage and economic loss claims in the realm of war-
ranty, contract law, negligence, or even Section 402A as limited to property claims only. In a warranty action, a
plaintiff could recover both incidental and consequential damages. MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-715 (Supp. 1995).
In such an event, the plaintiff must recognize the effect of the statute of limitations applicable to such claims.
Generally, the Mississippi Uniform Commercial Code bars claims for injuries that occur more than six years
after the seller tenders the product to the buyer. MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-2-725 (Supp. 1995) (However, under §
75-2-725(2), the time period may be extended under some circumstances.). This result may be particularly
harsh to a bystander who suffers property damage caused by a defective product tendered by the seller more
than six years prior to the injury. For property damage claims arising from damage caused by a defective prod-
uct, the statute of limitations pertaining to warranty claims may effectively function as a six year statute of
repose.
330. This reading would either require the definition of unreasonably dangerous to expand beyond the literal
reading of danger "to user or consumer" to include danger to the user's or consumer's property or result in a
reading that would limit claims for property damage to those involving a product that was unreasonably danger-
ous to a person, as opposed to property. This would be unduly restrictive and unjust. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 339-57.
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While the court, under canons of statutory construction, may ameliorate the
apparent harshness of a literal application of the Act to avoid an unintended con-
sequence,331 the best solution to the problem created by the language of the Act is
for the legislature to amend the Act to clearly delineate the Act's coverage. This
author suggests that the legislature add a statement expressly providing that the
Act covers claims for damages arising from any physical injury to a user, con-
sumer, reasonably foreseeable bystander, or property, other than the product
itself. A failure to adequately provide for property damage claims and economic
loss caused by defective products may lead to serious injustice in the tort and
warranty law of Mississippi.
5. Punitive Damages
In connection with the 1993 reform of the law of products liability, the legisla-
ture also enacted legislation governing actions for punitive damages.332 A full
discussion of the changes to the law of punitive damages is beyond the scope of
this Article; however, the new statute does affect products liability actions involv-
ing punitive damage claims.333 The new statute sets forth the evidentiary and
procedural requirements for a punitive damages claim. 34
With respect to products liability claims, the statute provides that a court may
not hold a nonmanufacturer-seller liable for punitive damages unless (1) "the
seller [had] substantial control over that aspect of the design, testing, manufac-
ture, packaging or labeling" of the defective product that caused injury; or (2) the
seller's "[alteration] or [modification] was a substantial factor in causing" the
injury; or (3) the seller "had actual knowledge of the defective condition of the
product at the time" he supplied it; or (4) "the seller made an express factual rep-
resentation about the aspect of the product which caused" the injury.33 In
essence, the punitive damages statute simply provides that a seller cannot be vic-
ariously liable for punitive damages in connection with the wrongful conduct of
a manufacturer.
G. What is Unreasonably Dangerous Under the Act?
1. Consumer Expectation or Risk-Utility?
The Act does not define the term "unreasonably dangerous." The initial ver-
sion of the bill defined the term as "dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary person who uses or consumes the product
331. See Evans v. Boyle Flying Service, Inc., 93-CA-00523-SCT, 1996 WL 515589 (Miss. Sep. 12, 1996);
McCullen v. State, 63 So. 2d 856, 861 (Miss. 1953).
332. MISS. CODE ANN. § 1 1-i-65 (Supp. 1995).
333. For a fuller discussion of the availability of punitive damages in a products liability claim, see Harges,
supra note 2, at 733-52.
334. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65 (Supp. 1995). The statute requires that the claimant prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the defendant acted with actual malice or with willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for
the safety of others, or committed actual fraud. Id. The trier of fact may consider an award of punitive dam-
ages only after compensatory damages have been awarded and after the court has determined that punitive dam-
ages may be submitted to the trier of fact after a separate evidentiary hearing before the trier of fact. The
statute provides specific matters which the trier of fact must consider in considering an award of punitive dam-
ages. Id. The court must review any punitive damage award for reasonableness.
335. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(g) (Supp. 1995).
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with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics. '33 The final bill, as enacted, dropped this definition, leaving to
the courts the job of defining the term. 37
Under the law of Mississippi prior to the Act, the term "unreasonably danger-
ous" had two meanings. Initially, the court understood the term in light of what
has been called the consumer expectation test.3 38 Under this approach, as set
forth in the Comments to Section 402A, a product is unreasonably dangerous if
the product is "in a condition not contemplated by the consumer."339 Under this
test, an open and obvious danger of a defect would bar recovery because the
product is not more dangerous than expected by the consumer.34  However, in
the case of Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage,34 1 the court explicitly adopted
another approach, the risk-utility test, to determine when a product is unreason-
ably dangerous. 42 Under this test, a product is unreasonably dangerous if "a rea-
sonable person would conclude that the danger-in-fact, whether foreseeable or
not, outweighs the utility of the product."
343
The shift from the consumer expectation test to the risk-utility test apparently
resulted in part from the court's concern that the former test would bar recovery
totally in cases where a danger was open and obvious to the consumer.344 Under
the risk-utility test, consumer expectation or awareness of danger is but one of
several factors to be weighed in evaluating whether the defective product is
unreasonably dangerous.34 ' The court concluded that the risk-utility test best
protects both the seller and the consumer.34 The manufacturer need not produce
an absolutely safe product, only a reasonably safe one, regardless of the
claimant's awareness of the danger.347  The test affords protection to the con-
sumer because obviousness of the danger is only one factor to consider in deter-
336. Act of Feb. 18, 1993, H.B. 1270, § l(b)(i), HI I.H93R1 102 (1993).
337. Act of Feb. 18, 1993, H.B. 1270, 1993 Miss. Laws ch. 302.
338. State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 121 (Miss.), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1966)
("Ordinarily the phrase 'defective condition' means that the article has something wrong with it, that it did not
function as expected."); Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews, 291 So. 2d 169, 172 (Miss. 1974) (quoting with approval
State Stove and Section 402A, cmt. g).
339. Section 402A, supra note 5, cmt. g.
340. See Melton v. Deere & Co., 887 F2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1989).
341. 617 So. 2d 248 (Miss. 1993). The court asserted that the shift had already occurred in the cases of Hall
v. Mississippi Chem. Exp., Inc., 528 So. 2d 796 (Miss. 1988) and Whittley v. City of Meridian, 530 So. 2d 1341
(Miss. 1988). However, Prestage was the first Mississippi case directly facing the issue and clearly articulating
the shift to a different standard. See Batts v. Tow-Motor Forklift Co., 153 F.R.D. 103 (N.D. Miss. 1994) (calling
the adoption of the risk utility test in Hall and Whittley the "best kept secret in Mississippi jurisprudence" prior
to the announcement in Prestage).
342. Prestage, 617 So. 2d at 256.
343. Id. at 254.
344. In Prestage, the defendant argued that the danger was open and obvious and that the application of the
consumer expectation test would absolutely bar recovery by the plaintiff. Id. at 251-52. See also Harges, supra
note 2, at 710 ("[Ilt is apparent that the risk-utility test is more favorable to the plaintiff.").
345. Prestage, 617 So. 2d at 256 n.3:
346. Id. at 256.
347. Id.
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mining whether the danger is unreasonable. 48 Thus, under the risk-utility test, if
the danger of the product outweighs its usefulness, a plaintiff may recover, even
if aware of the danger.349
At first glance, it would seem that the courts are free to apply the risk-utility
analysis in determining when a defective condition is unreasonably dangerous.
The Act does not overtly require a return to the consumer expectation test.
Certainly this appears to be true with reference to deviation defects and claims
involving breach of express warranty. The Act presumably continues to look to
the common law of Mississippi in defining the term."'
However, in claims involving warnings, the language of the Act goes a long
way toward reinstating the consumer expectation test. The Act explicitly reinstat-
ed the open and obvious defense as an absolute bar to recovery in cases of
alleged warning defects, legislatively overruling Prestage as it applies to warning
defect cases." 1 Specifically, the Act provided that in such cases the defendant is
not liable "if the danger posed by the product is known or is open and obvious to
the user or consumer of the product, or should have been known or open and
obvious to the user or consumer of the product." '52 Thus, in warnings cases, con-
sumer expectation of the risk of harm from an open and obvious danger is a mat-
ter that the defense must raise.
Moreover, in design cases, the Act also seems to resurrect the consumer expec-
tation test. In such cases, however, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof. The
Act requires the claimant to prove that "the product failed to function as expect-
ed," 3  implying that the consumer expectation test is a sine qua non in design
defect cases.35 4 Thus, except in cases involving deviation defects or breach of
express warranty cases, the vitality of the Prestage court's adoption of the risk-
utility test is in doubt.
348. Id. at 256 n.3. The court cites seven factors, citing John W. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability
for Products, 44 Miss. L. J. 825, 837-38 (1973):
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user and to the public as a
whole. (2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause injury, and the proba-
ble seriousness of the injury. (3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be as unsafe. (4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its utility. (5) The
user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product. (6) The user's antici-
pated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product..., or of the existence of suitable warnings
or instructions. (7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss by setting
the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Id.
349. Prestage, 617 So. 2d at 254.
350. Although the court decided Prestage only after the new legislation was passed, the court in Prestage
asserted that it had already shifted to the risk-utility test in 1988. Id. at 256. Thus, in all likelihood, the court
will interpret the term unreasonably dangerous as used in the statute in light of the risk-utility analysis, at least
in cases involving deviation defects or breach of express warranty. See id. at 256. See also Harges, supra note
2, at 713.
351. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(e) (Supp. 1995).
352. Id.
353. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1 1-1-63(f)(ii) (Supp. 1995).
354. The language of the Act is strongly reminiscent of the court's language in Ford Motor Co. v. Matthews,
291 So. 2d 169, 172 (Miss. 1974), stating that a defective condition exists when the product "did not function
as expected." Id. at 172. PART II of this Article will explore defenses in more detail, including the open and
obvious defense.
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2. Unreasonably Dangerous to Users or Consumers
The Act requires the claimant to prove that the product contained a defective
condition and that this condition rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer. 5 The Act provided for four categories of defective condi-
tion: (1) deviation defects,356 (2) failures to contain adequate warnings or instruc-
tions,35 7 (3) defective designs, 3 8 and (4) breaches of express warranty.3 9 In
cases involving deviation defects or breaches of warranty, the fact that a product
has a defect does not necessarily make the product unreasonably dangerous. The
Act requires the plaintiff to prove the existence of a defect,36 ' and that the defect
was unreasonably dangerous.361 Thus, mere proof of a deviation defect or breach
of express warranty does not establish that the product was unreasonably danger-
ous to the consumer or user.
In cases involving design or warning defects, the Act takes a slightly different
approach. In such cases, a product's defectiveness is understood in light of the
unreasonable danger to the user or consumer.362 Thus, the existence of a defec-
tive condition of a product in a warning case depends on the existence of a dan-
ger because of the inadequacy of the warnings or instructions, and this danger
must rise to the level of unreasonably dangerous for the defendant to be liable.
Likewise in a design case, the design must present a danger in order for it to be
considered a defective design and the danger must be unreasonable for liability
to attach.
3. Unreasonably Dangerous to Bystanders
The language of the statute requires that a bystander must prove that the prod-
uct is unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or user. 3  If interpreted literally,
this language could pose a problem to the bystander-claimant. In most cases, a
product that presents a risk to the bystander will present similar risks to the user
or consumer. However, the risks may not always overlap or be the same. A prod-
uct could conceivably not pose an unreasonable danger to the consumer or user,
while, nevertheless, posing an unreasonable danger to bystanders. For example,
suppose that a bystander plaintiff suffered injuries from fumes from a product
355. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63 (Supp. 1995).
356. MISS. CODE ANN. § 1 1-1-63(a)(i)(1) (Supp. 1995) ("The product was defective because it deviated in a
material way from the manufacturer's specifications or from otherwise identical units manufactured to the same
manufacturing specifications....").
357. Miss. CODE ANN. § I I-l-63(a)(i)(2) (Supp. 1995) ("The product was defective because it failed to con-
tain adequate warnings or instructions .... ).
358. MIss. CODE ANN. § 1 l-l-63(a)(i)(3) (Supp. 1995) ("The product was designed in a defective manner..
359. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(i)(4) (Supp. 1995) (The product breached an express warranty or failed
to conform to other express factual representations upon which the claimant justifiably relied in electing to use
the product .... ).
360. MIss. CODE ANN. § l l-1-63(a)(i) (Supp. 1995) ("The manufacturer or seller... shall not be liable if the
claimant does not prove ... that ... the product was defective .... ").
361. MIss. CODE ANN. § I 1-1-63(a)(ii) (Supp. 1995) (requiring that the claimant prove "[t]he defective condi-
tion rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer").
362. Miss. CODE ANN. § I l-l-63(a)(ii), (c)(i), (f)(i) (Supp. 1995).
363. MIss. CODE ANN. § I l-l-63(a)(ii) (Supp. 1995).
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used in reroofing a building. 64 If the manufacturer had warned the users of the
product, the employees of the roofing contractor, of the danger of inhaling the
fumes, the employees could have taken adequate precautions to avoid injury to
themselves, such as wearing appropriate breathing masks. However, the
bystander would not know of the danger at all and remain unprotected. Under a
literal reading of the Act, if the manufacturer sufficiently warned the consumer
or user of necessary precautions for the consumer's or user's personal safety, but
did not adequately warn or instruct for the protection of bystanders, the manufac-
turer may escape liability altogether for injuries to a bystander.
The court, thus, faces a dilemma in applying the Act to a bystander if the
bystander does not encounter the same risks as the user or consumer. The lan-
guage of the Act tracks the language of Section 402A, which the supreme court
extended to include bystanders." However, the American Law Institute deliber-
ately chose to express no opinion as to the status of bystanders." The difference
is that Section 402A is intended as a statement of the common law and does not
limit the development of common law rules when the language of the
Restatement proves inadequate. Thus, the supreme court properly went further
than the literal language of the Restatement in including bystanders as covered
by the rule expressed in Section 402A. However, the same flexibility is not pre-
sent when interpreting and applying statutes. The language of the Act may serve
to limit the remedies available to an injured bystander.
One could argue that courts should broadly interpret the terms "user" and
"consumer" to include bystanders. While this does some violence to the lan-
guage,36 7 it certainly is consistent with the law of most states, including
Mississippi, prior to the Act, to include bystanders within the protection of prod-
ucts liability rules. 68 It seems unlikely that the legislature intended to depart
from this protection. However, if the legislature intended to continue to extend
protection to bystanders, the Act does not adequately reflect this intent.
4. Unreasonably Dangerous to Property
The relationship of the Act to property damage claims, as discussed with refer-
ence to damages, is unclear.369 The literal language would appear to exclude
risks posed to property by a defective product from the concept of unreasonably
dangerous. The language of the Act refers only to unreasonable danger to the
user or consumer. 7' This stands in contrast to the general rule pertaining to
recovery of property damage in tort claims, including products liability claims. 71
364. Cf Swan v. IP., Inc., 613 So. 2d 846 (Miss. 1993) (involving injuries to a school teacher from fumes
given off by products used in reroofing the school where the teacher worked). Cf also Scordino v. Hopeman
Bros., Inc., 662 So. 2d 640 (Miss. 1995) (involving allegations of injuries to shipyard employees exposed to
asbestos dust during the installation of asbestos paneling by a subcontractor).
365. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Reeves, 486 So. 2d 374 (Miss. 1986).
366. Section 402A, supra note 5, caveat.
367. One must stretch the ordinary understanding of consumer or user to include bystanders within the scope
of such terms.
368. Cf TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 55, § 2.
369. See supra text accompanying notes 294-316.
370. Miss. CODE ANN. § 1 -1-63(a)(ii) (Supp. 1995).
371. 2 MADDEN, supra note 25, § 22.10.
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Section 402A explicitly refers to unreasonable danger to property.372 Tentative
Draft No. 2 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability retains this
concept as well.373
The omission of property in reference to an unreasonable danger presented by
a product is regrettable. If the court interprets the Act literally with reference to
unreasonable danger to a consumer or user, the Act dramatically alters the law of
Mississippi with respect to property damage claims and seriously limits the right
of injured parties to seek redress. This is particularly so if the Act is preemptive
with respect to other theories of liability for defective products that cause only
property damage. The omission confuses the issue of what is an unreasonably
dangerous condition under the Act. The best resolution, absent an amendment by
the legislature, is for the courts to interpret the unreasonably-dangerous-to-the-
user-or-consumer requirement as including within its scope unreasonable danger
to the user's or consumer's property as well.
111. Conclusion
The Products Liability Act of 1993 made significant changes in the law of
Mississippi, though it did not necessarily improve, stabilize, or clarify the law as
intended. Clearly the Act gives greater protection to sellers and manufacturers
than under Section 402A as applied by the Mississippi Supreme Court. 374
However, the new law is not as clear as it should be in matters of terminology or
definition. Moreover, the Act's language could lead to harsh consequences for
those suffering from economic loss or property damage caused by defective
products. Bystanders may have significantly less protection of their interests in
freedom from harm caused by defective products. However, the full impact of
the Act will not be evident until the court has had the opportunity to interpret the
various provisions of the new law.
In the meantime, the legislature should revisit products liability law to elimi-
nate confusion and inequities in the current Act. In particular, the legislature
should define the term "product," and extend the Act's coverage of sellers to
include commercial product suppliers who are not technically sellers.
Consideration should be given to precise declaration of the status of used product
sellers as well, especially with reference to negligence and warranty claims. The
legislature should expressly extend coverage to claims of bystanders for injuries
caused by defective products by including danger to bystanders in the concept of
unreasonably dangerous. The legislature should also reinstate the availability of
physical property damage claims by including danger to property in the concept
of unreasonably dangerous. The legislature should return claims for pure eco-
nomic damages to the law of warranty where courts have historically placed such
claims. Amendments to the Act could go a long way to avoiding unnecessary
confusion, difficulty, and possible injustices in interpreting and applying the Act
by the legal community and courts.
372. Section 402A, supra note 5.
373. "TENTATIVE DRAFT, supra note 55, §§ 1, 2, 6.
374. PART II of this Article will address in more detail the Act's changes with reference to the requirements of
proving the existence of the various categories of defects and the defenses available.
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